Recruitment and Representation: A Study of the Social Backgrounds and Political Career Patterns of Members of the West German Bundestag, 1949-1969

By

GERALD GLENN WATSON

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To Diane and Christy

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Abstract of Dissertation Presented to the Graduate Council of the University of Florida in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

RECRUITMENT AND REPRESENTATION: A STUDY OF THE SOCIAL BACKGROUNDS AND POLITICAL CAREER PATTERNS OF MEMBERS OF THE WEST GERMAN BUNDESTAG, 1949-1969

By

Gerald Glenn Watson

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Systematic empirical analysis into the process of leadership selection has made substantial progress since World War II. In recent years there has been a rising interest in model-building and increasing sophistication in the research design and selection of variables. The primary purpose of this thesis is to describe the social backgrounds and career patterns of some 1,161 Members of the West German Federal Parliament, the Bundestag. The analysis includes all Deputies from the two major political parties, the Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU) and the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD), who have served in the period 1949-1969.

The study begins with a survey of the literature on political recruitment and an attempt to conceptualize the process in terms of the interaction between motivations and perceptions of opportunity and risk. This is followed by a discussion of the political setting, with emphasis placed on the historical role of parliaments in Germany,

the contemporary governmental structure, the electoral system, the parties, and aspects of political culture. Most important is the central position of the political parties which, through their manipulation of the electoral statutes and organizational control of the House, effectively diminish the role of the electorate and the independence of Deputies. Low levels of political participation, beyond the narrow act of voting, however, suggest that "government for the people" may be a necessity.

Deputies are older, better educated, have more prestigeous occupations, and are more likely to be male than the general populace. Only in religious affiliation do they even roughly mirror society. Although legislators do not accurately mirror the electorate at large, interparty differences are, in direction, generally consistent with the parties' contrasting social bases in the electorate. It is evident that people are differentially recruited into the party structures on the basis of their social backgrounds. Given the distribution of their social support in the electorate and, particularly in the CDU, the existence of a number of relatively well organized subgroups within the party, the parties have been forced to give some attention to social criteria and group affiliation as they go about the task of selecting district candidates and balancing the party lists. But social restrictions are exceedingly broad and the parties have been largely

successful in setting more specifically political requirements for high elective office, notably a considerable amount of party and public officeholding experience.

Political careers are analyzed in terms of a basic four-fold typology of career patterns. This is followed by a more detailed examination of the sequential aspect of public and party officeholding and an attempt to measure the amount of "structure" in political careers. In the public arena opportunities for advancement to Parliament are best for those persons presently serving in a local council, county council, or Landtag. In the parties, local leaders and primary-level executive committee members are most likely to be advanced to the House. We have found that opportunities are structured to a significant degree, that this structure is national in scope and, somewhat paradoxically, transcends the parties at the same time that it is channelled through them. Finally, while the shape of the opportunity structure is undergoing constant incremental change, developments are clearly in the direction of more structure, not less.

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Empirical studies of political recruitment have been conducted for at least three-quarters of a century (see Haynes, 1895) and a normative interest in who should rule can be traced back to Plato. Various writers have argued that recruitment studies can shed light on such diverse and important political questions as the nature of society's dominant values, the degree to which elites are "representative," the level of systemic integration, the kinds of change taking place in the power structure, and the requirements for political success (see Seligman, 1959: 154; Matthews, 1954: 38; Quandt, 1970: 184-189). The most common studies are concerned with the social backgrounds of officeholders. Much less attention has been devoted to "the intramural sorting and screening processes" which result in election to public office (Prewitt and Eulau, 1971: 293). As Seligman (1959: 154) wrote more than a decade ago, "The 'who' has been stressed to the neglect of the 'how' of recruitment."

The primary purposes of this paper are to describe the career patterns of some 1,161 Members of the West

German Federal Parliament, the Bundestag, to relate those patterns to certain constituency characteristics, and to indicate whether or not these findings are consistent with hypotheses based on the provocative thesis on "political ambition" which Joseph Schlesinger (1966) has developed and applied to the American political scene. Since the emphasis here is clearly on the political experiences and strategic positions of individuals within the structure of political opportunity, it should serve as a partial corrective to the over-emphasis on the "who" of recruitment.

Ambition Theory and the Structure of Political Opportunities

Systematic empirical analysis into the process of leadership selection has made substantial progress since World War II.[1] In recent years there has been a rising interest in model-building, greater awareness of the need to relate chosen variables to some kind of theory, and increasing sophistication in the research design and selection of variables (see, for example, Jacob, 1962; Browning, 1968; Schlesinger, 1966; Kornberg and Winsborough, 1968). As one investigator observed recently:

> During a relatively short period of time, research has advanced from inquiries into the social background of legislators to more complex studies, in which recruitment has been related to the characteristics of the electorate, the workings of party organizations, or the orientations and behavior of legislators (Czudnowski, 1970: 216).

Despite significant advancement, recruitment studies, the vast majority of which continue to emphasize social background factors, have been severely criticized for a variety of reasons. Perhaps the most important criticism is that the chosen variables lack significance and do not improve our ability to predict behavior (see Jacob, 1962: 706; Meynaud, 1961: 525-526; Schlesinger, 1966: 12-13; Edinger and Searing, 1967; Searing, 1969).[2] At the same time, results are reported in such idiosyncratic fashion that meaningful comparison becomes extremely difficult, if not impossible (Quandt, 1970: 182).[3] In both cases, particularly the former, the difficulty stems from the lack of an explicit theoretical framework which can guide research and promote a needed degree of uniformity.

One of the most suggestive and potentially useful approaches to the comparative study of political recruitment has been the development of ambition theory as a viable alternative to social background analysis (see Schlesinger, 1966; Schlesinger, 1967).[4] The concept of political ambition and the research orientation that stems from it are admirably suited to meet the criticisms mentioned above. An ambition theory of politics brings a unique perspective to the study of political recruitment by drawing attention to the political experiences and strategic positions of individuals. If politics is a game, then ambition theory directs our attention to the successful strategies for winning, or advancing in

the game. "From the perspective of ambition theory . . .such mundane data as the tenure and turnover of officeholders, office successions, and the ages of elective officials take on major significance" (Schlesinger, 1966: 15).

Each of us knows what ambition is. We view it in ourselves as a desirable characteristic, in others somewhat less favorably. It is a word brimming with connotative meanings; some favorable, many not. It is manifest in our distrust of politicians and politics itself, a dirty game in which self-interest prevails. Little systematic use, however, has been made of ambition as a concept of political analysis. Those who have used it rigorously, such as Downs (1965) and Schlesinger, have been greatly influenced by economic theory. Schlesinger (1966: vii), for example, sees politics as "a series of rational marginal choices made by men competing for power within a given set of political rules."

Quite obviously, the ambitious politician is an abstraction, just as is Economic Man. It is, however, a useful analytic device with a high degree of face validity. Thus, Schlesinger's (1966: 14) answer to those who prefer some other cause of action--social, psychological, or ideological--is straightforward: these are not "political" explanations, whereas ambition places a "political perspective on background data."

Ambition gives direction to the competition which Schlesinger describes and it is crucial for system stability and responsiveness:

> A political system unable to kindle ambitions for office is as much in danger of breaking down as one unable to restrain ambitions. Representative government, above all, depends on a supply of men so driven; the desire for election becomes the electorates' restraint upon its public officials. No more irresponsible government is imaginable than one of high-minded men unconcerned for their political futures (1966: 2).

What he means by it is quite clear: it is the overt goal orientation of the individual political actor. Self-interest lies at the heart of his theory, but it is the explicit, personal ambition of the individual operating within a set of opportunities which he cannot influence which distinguishes Schlesinger's approach from that of others.

Ambition theory can be briefly described in terms of one major theorem and two corollaries. The central assumption is the deceptively simple idea already mentioned: "a politician's behavior is a response to his office goals" (Schlesinger, 1966: 6). Closely related to this are these major corollaries:

(1) "The ambitions of any politician flow from the expectations which are reasonable for a man in his position" (Schlesinger, 1966: 9).

(2) "We can bring order to the office ambitions of politicians only if we can find order in their chances or opportunities for office" (Schlesinger, 1966: 11).

The corollaries are interrelated because opportunities must be structured in order for the investigator to reasonably assess the direction of ambition for persons in different locations in the hierarchy of political office.[5] It should also be clear that ambition theory contains both an undifferentiated motivational component and an implicit perceptual component, since the individual must be capable of perceiving that certain actions taken by himself have a reasonable prospect of maximizing goal attainment. But perceptions are more usually the concern of psychologists and social psychologists, and it is at this point that Schlesinger makes an inferential leap that has important implications for research.

Schlesinger (1966: 198) assumes that by delineating the structure of opportunities inferences can be made about the directions of political ambitions and possible behavioral consequences. His approach to ambition, then, is purely inferential since substantive research is limited to identifying the size and shape of the formal opportunity structure (1966: 20).[6] It is important to understand that ambition is a theoretical construct whose empirical referent is the opportunity structure. Thus, the research orientation which we share with Schlesinger emphasizes the structure and sequence of political experiences in the politician's background. Key variables are: the opportunity rate, base offices,

Manifest offices, first and penultimate offices, and the age at which a particular office is attained (see Schlesinger, 1966: 37-56, 70-118 and 172-193; Watson, 1969: 38-111). These terms will be discussed in more detail in the substantive chapters. For the moment it is sufficient to point out that use of these key political career variables allowed Schlesinger (1966: 93) to clearly distinguish Senatorial from Gubernatorial careers, a further indication of the importance of taking the office experiences of individuals into account in any study of leadership selection.

Since its rather sophisticated formulation by Schlesinger, the notion of political ambition has been fruitfully applied by several investigators, including this author. Soule (1969) interviewed 97 of 110 Members of the Michigan House of Representatives and identified their ambitions as either "progressive" or "non-progressive," depending on whether or not they reported a desire to seek higher political office. He found that progressive ambitions were positively related at significant levels to: (1) early political socialization, (2) certain personality traits and (3) a legislator's "representational" and "areal" role orientations (449-454). Mezey (1970) has developed a "model" of congressional recruitment (U. S. House of Representatives) in terms of three

variables: (1) inter-party opportunities for congressional seats, (2) intra-party opportunities and (3) the past elective experience of candidates. He found that successful majority party candidates were more likely to have held previous political office and had lower personnel turnover rates than in the minority party (566). Finally, Watson (1969) has described the career patterns of the state Parliament, state government and Bundestag delegation from Lower Saxony, one of the Laender of the Federal Republic of Germany. Careers were found to be more structured than for U. S. Senators or Governors (107), and there were two identifiable opportunity structures, one centered upon the Landtag and Landesregierung, the other on the Bundestag (112).

While all of these investigations lend support to the notion of political ambition as a useful research orientation, only one has gone outside the American context (Watson, 1969), and that largely at a sub-national level.[7] There are a number of problems involved in generalizing from the American case, not the least of which is that American politics is widely recognized to be surprisingly pragmatic, suggesting that ambition may play a unique role here.[8] Czudnowski has outlined other potential problems stemming from generalizations based on the rather unique features of "Anglo-American" political systems in the following statement:

> These systems share at least two characteristics: a plurality-system of elections in single-member districts, and a political infrastructure based essentially on a two-party system. Thus, two important variables in the analysis of recruitment are held constant, and a third--the degree of inter-party competitiveness--is defined in terms of a two-party setting with single-member districts (1970: 217).

Disregarding for the moment the precise nature of the differences between the American and West German political systems, which will be discussed in the third chapter, it is clear that the utility of ambition theory rests on the accumulation of readily comparable data for a number of systems. The ambition perspective may prove to be no more fruitful than social background analysis, but the high degree of face validity and preliminary findings would argue against such an interpretation. At any rate, such uncertainty as exists does not mitigate against the collection of data, since any conclusions about the ultimate utility of political ambition as an organizing concept must be deferred until such data has been collected and submitted to rigorous analysis.

The present undertaking, then, although limited to a single country, was designed to improve our capacity for making significant comparisons by replicating aspects of Schlesinger's work in the German context. By focusing on clearly political variables, the office experiences of legislators, and by tying these to

a theoretical referent, namely, ambition theory, it is hoped that most of the objections mentioned it conjunction with social background analysis can be overcome, or at least minimized. In addition, the problem of comparability should be lessened by the employment of similarly coded variables. The present research then can be viewed as a contribution to the requisite data base, as well as being a case study of parliamentary recruitment capable of standing on its own merits. This is particularly the case, since the data has been filed in readily available form for use in subsequent research.[9]

The Research Design

Once it was determined that a study of Bundestag recruitment was desirable and feasible, given the availability of information and time, a number of critical decisions remained.[10] In the following section six of these critical decisions and their impact on data collection, reporting, and interpretation will be discussed. The first four decisions are practical and involve the need to set definite parameters to the study. The latter two more clearly involve the kind of data to be collected and the manner in which it is to be reported.

The first two decisions had a critical impact on the scope of research because they maximized the number

of cases to be considered. The first decision was not to sample, but to collect information on an entire population. The reasoning here was simply that this maximized reliability of the findings and eliminated dependence on tests of statistical significance. The second decision was to collect information on all Bundestag sessions since the creation of the Federal Republic in 1949. A structure of opportunity develops over time, and it was thought desirable to include the greatest possible span of time in the calculations.[11] A more important consideration was that this approach would maximize the flexibility of data manipulation, since longitudinal, sessional, or aggregate analysis could be conducted.[12]

A third decision was made to limit data collection to Abgeordneten, or Deputies, from the two major parties. The Christian Democratic Union and its Bavarian affiliate, the Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU), and the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) have been represented in every Bundestag session and have always been the largest parties, never polling a combined total of less than 60.2 per cent of the vote (see Plischke, 1969: 71, 163; Conradt, 1970: 343). In the last election (1969) they polled 87.9 per cent of the vote and received 94.0 per cent of the Bundestag mandates (Conradt, 1970: 343). The only other party presently in the Bundestag, the Free Democratic Party (FDP), has never

gotten more than 12.8 per cent of the vote (1961) and received less than half that amount (5.8 per cent) in the 1969 elections (see Conradt 1970: 343). They have not won a direct seat since 1957. The major reason for limiting data collection to the major parties is that most of the minor party delegations have been so small and unstable (Obermann, 1956: insert following p. 44) that it would be extremely difficult to establish meaningful career patterns. One could make a good case for including the FDP, but since one of the major goals is to relate career patterns to constituency characteristics, for which purpose the FDP is obviously unsuited, it was decided to simplify matters by eliminating that party from the analysis altogether.

The fourth decision is not an obvious one, but it was hinted at in the last paragraph: we are studying Members of Parliament, not candidates. While this is a hidden decision, it is nonetheless, a particularly crucial one because it limits the kinds of generalizations that we can make. Most important, it seriously hinders our ability to ascertain those background experiences which improve one's chances for success in politics by making comparisons between successful and unsuccessful candidates impossible. Schlesinger (1966), Kornberg and Winsborough (1968) and Mezey (1970) illustrate the successful use of this kind of information. The lack of available data (except for occupation in a few instances) forced this

regretable limitation. Whenever possible, information about candidate characteristics derived from secondary sources (Zeuner, 1970; Loewenberg, 1966; Fishel, 1970) will be given for comparative purposes.

These four decisions define the universe of subjects, all major-party Bundestag Deputies serving in the period 1949-1969, but tell nothing about the kinds of information to be collected on each individual, or the manner in which it will be reported. To this, one must turn to the other major decisions mentioned earlier.

The fifth major decision was to collect both social background and political career data on each subject. Although initially uncertain as to the use which would be made of the former information, several considerations entered into the decision to broaden the data universe beyond the more strictly political categories. One factor, for example, was simply the belief that, since the information was available, it was better to record it now than to regret the omission at a later point. A second, and more important consideration, however, was the desire to have some variables which could be directly compared with the findings of other German studies. As we shall see momentarily, major problems of comparability still exist, but the data has proven helpful, particularly in the construction of a composite occupational background variable.

The sixth decision could be broken down into several choices, but the ultimate result was a decision to emphasize an individual's initial Bundestag recruitment and only secondarily to collect information on each subsequent re-election. This is an important decision because of the interest in the sequence of officeholding in a person's background. Sequential coding of first and penultimate offices, therefore, was done only for a person's initial entry into the Bundestag. For each subsequent election only simultaneously held offices were listed, from which it is impossible to determine sequence. This decision reinforced a broad, underlying choice to consider the individual as the unit of analysis, without regard to the session in which he served. Each person is considered only once in determining career sequence, rather than separately for each session in which he served, thus eliminating weighted representation of persons elected to more than one term.[13]

There were, of course, may other decisions that had to be made. The way in which variables were coded, for example, determines to a large extent the kinds of manipulations possible and the way in which findings are presented. But these choices are rather specific and can be discussed more effectively when dealing with individual variables. It is more relevant at this point to indicate how this study differs from prior investigations of Bundestag recruitment and in what sense it may be

considered a significant advance.

The number of German recruitment studies is not large, but a surprisingly wide range of subject has been explored. In addition to a number of works on the Bundestag, general studies of elite recruitment (Edinger, 1960; Zapf, 1965), party leadership selection (Mayntz, 1961; Edinger, 1961), cabinet formation (Knight, 1952; Loewenberg, 1966: 219-263), and the recruitment of local and state public officeholders (Mayntz, 1961; Watson, 1969) have been conducted. Until recently, most research stemmed from an interest in determining the degree to which ties with the totalitatian past had been broken (Kirchheimer, 1950; Edinger, 1960; Edinger, 1961). But as the German political system has stabilized and public support for its institutions has grown, this explicit, somewhat pathological, orientation has declined.[14]

Whatever the motivation, most recruitment studies are largely descriptive and lack a rigorous theoretical framework (see, for example, Kitzinger, 1960; Obermann, 1956; Kaufmann et al., 1961; Zeuner, 1970). Some are excellent in their own right (Kitzinger, 1960; Domes, 1964; Kaufmann et al., 1961), but others (see, for example, Obermann, 1956) skirt the borders of insignificance and are clearly the kind of work Matthews (1954: 59) had in mind when he wrote that "one always

is impressed by the industry, patience, and arithmetical skill which have gone into constructing these tables, but not always by their political significance."

The only major study of Bundestag recruitment that does employ a sophisticated framework is Gerhard Loewenberg's Parliament in the German Political System (1966).[15] The scope of this book extends far beyond political recruitment, as the author attempts to survey the historical role of Parliament, its present position in the legislative process and its effectiveness in representation. Loewenberg's chapter on recruitment is primarily concerned with assessing the relationship between recruitment, the social and political backgrounds of Members, and the functions of the Bundestag in the German political system (1966: 40-130). The analysis is based on the following explicit hypothesis:

> The recruitment of members of parliament is affected by a number of related and relatively stable variables. These include public orientations toward members of parliament, the material and psychological rewards and conditions of the mandate, the organization and membership structure of the political parties, their ideological commitments and their dependence on related interest groups, the pattern of inter-party competition, and the requirements of the electoral law (Loewenberg, 1966: 40).

Loewenberg's work is excellent in every respect. It is comprehensive, sophisticated and sensitive. In a word, it is the indispensable source for an understanding of

the role of the Bundestag in the German political system. But, as a study of political recruitment, it has several weaknesses which must be mentioned.[16] First of all, most attention is devoted to social background characteristics, such as education, occupation, and religion, although some consideration is given to age factors and prior political experience. More important, however, is the fact that this is not really a study of recruitment at all, at least as we have implicitly used that term, but rather a study of the composition of the house at a particular moment in time, in this case October 15, 1957, when the first meeting of the Third Bundestag took place (Loewenberg, 1966: 84). This distinction is not insignificant, as the reader may first imagine. Rather, it brings us squarely to a consideration of the ways in which this undertaking differs from previous research.

The most common type of study and, in the view of some, the least interesting is "the analysis of a single political unit at a single point in time" (Quandt, 1970: 182). This clearly separates the present research, which covers the twenty-year period 1949-1969, from Loewenberg's work and, indeed, almost all other recruitment studies, whether in Germany or elsewhere.

There are also less crucial distinguishing features which serve to separate this project from certain other studies. For example, Fishel (1970) surveyed 173 candidates for the fifth (1965) session, far less than

the total population with which we are concerned. Other investigators have looked at Parliamentary recruitment in one or several Laender, either for a single election (Kaufmann et al., 1961; Watson, 1969) or for several sessions (Varain, 1961).

This project is a significant advance over previous research for at least three reasons. First, it is, by almost any measure, the most comprehensive study of Bundestag recruitment yet completed. Second, the emphasis on initial recruitment based on a population covering a twenty-year time period should serve as a useful complement to momentary, or sessional, studies. Finally, because of the manner in which the data has been collected and stored, and particularly because information has been obtained on subsequent re-election, a great variety of data manipulations are possible. It is perfectly possible, for example, to re-order the data for sessional or true longitudinal analysis, although this will not be done for this paper. Finally, although little attempt will be made here to relate recruitment patterns to political outputs, the data is readily available for such investigations in the future.[17] It is hoped that it will be a research tool of continuing utility as this writer and others explore the implications of recruitment patterns for behavior.

NOTES

1. Excellent critical surveys of the literature are contained in Jacob (1962), Meller (1960), Meynaud (1961). Older, but still useful, is Matthews (1954: chs. 2-3). The reader may also want to consult the extensive bibliographies in the following: Beck and McKechnie (1962); Marvick (1961: 334-343); Edinger (1967: Introduction and 348-366); LaPalombara and Weiner (1966: 462-464); Quandt (1970: 214-238).

2. For example, Jacob (1962: 706) writes:

> As purely information sources these studies are without equal. Yet their information is frequently left unstructured; the absence of a theoretical framework leaves the reader wondering about the significance of it all.

Even more definitive is Donald Searing's (1969: 490) comment:

> Given the present state of knowledge concerning attitude formation and change, we can conclude in the strongest terms possible for discursive social-science analysis of this nature that the background taxonomy currently employed in elite studies is inadequate for forecasting attitudinal distributions among elite populations.

3. Although recruitment studies have been severely criticized for a variety of reasons, one of the most telling is simply that data collection and preparation has not usually been approached with comparative analysis in mind (Quandt, 1970: 182). Thus, the most common type of recruitment study focuses on a single body at a unique moment in time, which makes cross-national or even longitudinal comparisons exceedingly difficult, particularly when one takes into account the highly personalistic manner in which such variables as occupation are coded. As examples of the attempt to cope with the problem of comparability, the reader should look at Quandt (1970) and Ralf Dahrendorf's exciting and insightful book, Society and Democracy in Germany (1969: especially chs. 14-19).

4. This is not to suggest that social background data is irrelevant to the process of political recruitment. As will be shown in the next chapter, it plays a legitimate, if limited role. Critics have wielded their ax too freely, justified their conclusions by setting up straw men to be easily toppled, and failed to come to grips with the real complexity of the relationship between social class, recruitment, and behavior.

5. Schlesinger suggests that ambitions may take three directions (1966: 10). If the politician wants a particular office for a specified period and then plans to withdraw from public office, his ambitions are "discrete." If he wishes to make a long-run career out of a particular position, his ambitions are "static." Finally, if he wishes to attain an even higher office than he presently holds or is seeking, his ambitions are "progressive."

6. This is admittedly one of the key weaknesses of ambitions theory as it is employed by this author and Schlesinger. There is certainly an element of choice involved in deciding to analyze aggregate data rather than conduct in-depth psychological interviews, or, more superficially, to ask the politician about his ambitions. Schlesinger (1966: 198) writes: "I am well aware that I have not demonstrated either that American politicians do in fact perceive their opportunities as I have described them or that the opportunity structure affects political aspirations." There are advantages which may override this limitation, however, notably that data is more readily available, the model can be extended to include other historical epochs, and generalizations may be more meaningful. In addition, there is the practical consideration that understanding the structure of opportunities is logically prior to bringing order to ambitions. Thus, Jacob and Browning (1964) have found upon direct examination that ambitions are not distributed randomly, but intimately related to available opportunities.

7. Schlesinger (1967) has also made limited cross-national career comparisons for the U.S., Canada, Australia, Great Britain, and France. The depth of analysis, however, is hardly comparable to his seminal study of the structure of political opportunities in the United States.

8. Contrast, for example, Sorauf's (1968: 3) contention that American parties are unusually preoccupied with contesting elections with Kirchheimer's (1966: 51) view of the German situation where "hankering for the spoils of government by impatient politicians is not a major element in political party life, nor does it force what one may call an electoral style on political competition."

9. The biographical data for this study and a detailed codebook are filed with the political science data lab, Department of Political Science, Universtiy of Florida.

10. The basic data sources for this study are the official biographical sketches for each member contained in the Amtliches Handbuch des deutschen Bundestages, Wahlperiode II-VI (1953-1969). This information is supplemented when necessary by consulting Wer ist Wer? and Who's Who in Germany, standard biographical reference works. Information on the demographic characteristics of the 248 elective constituencies has been kindly provided by Dr. David Conradt, who has gathered the information from standard statistical publications of the Federal Republic.

11. A similar justification has been employed by Prewitt and Eulau (1971) in their study of the social bias in leadership selection. In that study the authors summed and averaged electoral turnout over a ten-year period and justified the decision by arguing that "our purpose here was to neutralize secular trends precisely because we were more interested in reconstructing the politician's 'psycho-political life space,' . . . than in describing 'reality'" (297).

12. An understanding of these terms is essential for grasping the basic argument advanced later in the chapter for the uniquity of the project. As we employ these terms, "longitudinal" analysis means the study of change over time. "Sessional" analysis, on the other hand, means the study of a particular political unit at a given moment in time. Obviously, this can be employed successively to create a kind of longitudinal analysis, when the sessions are used as discrete points along a time continuum. In this paper, however, we will primarily rely on what is called, for lack of a better term, "aggregate" analysis. By this we mean the consideration of information gathered over a period of time, in this case 1949-1969, as a single population. There is no attempt made to determine trends over time.

13. The actual method of data recording is as follows. Three 80-space formats were employed. The first two formats correspond to card #1 and card #2 each case, respectively. The first format contains general social background information, while the second format includes the variables to be employed in the analysis of initial recruitment. Together these cards constitute the basic deck used for most of the analysis reported in the paper. The third format resembles, in basic form, the second format and is employed each time a person was re-elected.

Thus, if a person served 4 terms, the appropriate format would be punched on three separate cards, one for each re-election. These cards would be numbered three through five. The number of cards per case, then, may range from two to as many as seven if a person served in all six sessions. A more detailed listing of the individual variables is available in the author's codebook.

14. Survey research covering the period 1949-1967 indicates a steady rise in public support for the political institutions of the Federal Republic (see Institut für Demoskopie, 1967: 14-20, 31-37). In a recent elite survey two-thirds of respondents regarded the present system as "stable" (see Wildenmann, 1968: 58).

15. See also the more recent works by Kaack (1969) and Zeuner (1970):

16. This should not be taken as a criticism, given Loewenberg's basic purpose and the obvious limits which any investigator must set for himself. Loewenberg's sensitive portrayal of the relationship between recruitment patterns and the way in which the Bundestag fulfills its representative function is clearly indicitive of the direction in which future career pattern analysis could move.

17. It should, perhaps, be emphasized again that the author is well aware that the present undertaking is not directly "behavioral." Wahlke (1962: 174-175) is entirely correct when he argues that "one variety of study often erroneously thought to be distinctively 'behavioral' is that which ascertains certain demographic characteristics of the membership of particular representative bodies . . .they tend to be purely descriptive." According to Wahlke, the case for collecting quantities of such descriptive information is best argued by W. O. Aydelotte ("A Statistical Analysis of the Parliament of 1841: some problems of method," (1954) Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research, 27: 141) who hopes that "revealing correlations" may be discovered. Wahlke is also correct, however, when he argues that more than the possibility of interesting correlations are needed:

> Logically, two sorts of hypotheses are needed: first, hypotheses concerning the circumstances which lead to the presence or absence of representatives with certain characteristics; second, and more important, hypotheses concerning the consequences of variations in these characteristics for the behavior of individual legislators and, thereby, for the working of the representative body (1962: 175).

This study will certainly attempt to meet the first need, but because of lack of appropriate data, will be able to do little that is truly behavioral at this time.

CHAPTER 2

POLITICAL RECRUITMENT: DEFINITION AND CONCEPTUALIZATION

The goal of this chapter is to define the term "political recruitment," and to conceptualize the process of political socialization and participation which culminates in election to public office. As a part of this discussion, much of the relevant literature will be reviewed for substantive findings and heuristic concepts.[1] It is not our purpose, however, to make explicit use of most of the framework developed here in the later chapters. The conceptualization is presented only to help the reader place the key research variables, social background and political career experiences, in proper perspective as regards the total process of political recruitment.

A Definition

Political recruitment can be defined in a variety of ways. One can speak of recruitment to politics per se, initial recruitment, or recruitment to a particular office structure. The most satisfactory definition for our purposes is institutionally specific. Kim (1967: 1036),

for example, views recruitment as "the entire process involved in a person's induction into a position." Similarly, Almond and Coleman (1960: 32) refer to "the special political role socialization which occurs in a society 'on top of' the general political socialization" and Prewitt and Eulau (1971: 293) speak of "the intramural sorting and screening processes" which mean "advancing from being politically active to becoming a candidate for political office." From this perspective, to study recruitment is to examine how individuals get into specific positions of leadership. It has the advantage of being general in form, but unique to whichever institution or office structure is being investigated.

These definitions stand in rather sharp contrast to those that either equate recruitment with high levels of political activity (Pye, 1962: 45-46) or seek to limit use of the term to initial recruitment, preferring the term "political promotion" for all subsequent office activity (Jacob, 1962: 706; Fishel, 1969: 1214).[2] High levels of political activity, what Milbrath (1965: 18) calls "gladiatorial" activities, include such things as being and active party member attending meetings, and contributing time to a political campaign, as well as being a candidate or officeholder. It is, thus, too vague and diffuse a category and is not, in any case, limited to officeholders which are our sole

concern. It is possible, of course, to argue that most recruitment studies have focused on political promotion rather than initial election, but this is an obvious truth and a not very useful distinction, since it merely seeks to substitute one word for another, without clarifying the underlying concept.

In this paper we follow the more generally accepted practice of using the term "recruitment" to refer to the entire process of selecting Members of the West German Bundestag, while recognizing that this is, in actuality, an example of political promotion. In attempting to understand the nature of that process it is helpful to think of it as part of the total process of political socialization and participation.[3]

Political Participation

Political participation ranges from simply exposing oneself to stimuli to holding public and party office, with the most common form being the intermittent act of voting. Milbrath (1965: 18), who has explored the subject of participation in a fascinating book, suggests that people can be grouped into four broad categories along the continuum of political activity in terms of the amount of time and energy devoted to politics.[4] "Apathetics," those who do not vote and essentially avoid politics, are the least active. Most people are

"spectators" who participate in the system by voting and discussing politics. "Transitional" activities, such as contacting public officials or attending political meetings, clearly separate the third group from the relatively passive role of "spectators." Finally, those who are actively committed to politics, who contribute time to candidates, or perhaps become candidates and officeholders themselves, are engaged in what Milbrath calls "gladiatorial" behavior. The rank-ordering of political activities is assumed to be generally valid from one country to the next, since it is based on time and energy costs (Milbrath, 1965: 19). This does not mean, however, that the same proportion of the population in different political systems will engage in similar activities. Political culture, for example, is an important variable affecting the amount and kind of participation and will be discussed in the next chapter.

The hierarchy of political involvement is relevant to an understanding of political recruitment for at least three reasons. First, involvement tends to be cumulative, due to the fact that persons who engage in more costly activities, such as working in a campaign, are also likely to vote and discuss politics with others. Secondly, research indicates a positive correlation between the levels of participation and such socio-economic variables as income, occupation, education,

age and sex. Thus, voters are more likely to be male, older, more affluent, better educated, more knowledgeable and more partisan than nonvoters (Campbell et al., 1964: 250-265; Lane, 1959; Lane, 1970; Milbrath 1965: 110-141). Similarly, recruitment studies have shown that party activists and public officeholders are predominantly drawn from the middle and upper-middle socio-economic brackets, are more knowledgeable and better educated than the mass electorate (Matthews, 1954: 32; Matthews, 1961; Meynaud, 1961: 525; Sorauf, 1968: 92-96; Bowman and Boynton, 1966; Prewitt and Eulau, 1971).

Obviously, many of the variables are interrelated. For example, Lane (1970) attributed the differential rates of participation between middle class (high) and working class (low) to eleven factors, including education, time and energy available for political activity, economic security, self-esteem, child-rearing practices, civic responsibility, and greater cross-pressures on the working class. Similarly, Berelson and Steiner (1964: 422-426) think the higher participation rates of high SES persons is due to three factors: (1) they are better educated, (2) they are more likely to perceive that they have a stake in politics, (3) they are more likely to interact with persons active in politics.

The hierarchy of political involvement is a useful conceptualization for yet a third reason: it points to a major turning point in the process of political

participation which can be called the "gladiatorial threshold." Although the various forms of participation are hierarchically arranged, the process of transition is not smooth, but discontinuous:

> Occasionally, a spectator jumps into the political fray. But, by and large, personality and environmental factors encourage persons to stay in their roles. There seems to be a kind of threshold that must be crossed before a person changes role; this is especially characteristic of the transition from spectator to gladiator. A person needs a strong push from the environment (e.g., earnest solicitation from a friend) or needs to feel very strongly about an issue or a candidate before he will cross the threshold and become a political combatant. Once the threshold is crossed and the new team member becomes integrated in his role, he usually participates in a wide repertoire of political acts (Milbrath, 1965: 20-21).

The change in level of activity is not unlike the changes of state that occur when water is changed into ice or steam. The idea of a threshold serves to identify the initial stage of political recruitment and helps to distinguish it from other forms of political participation.

Merely showing that there are levels of political activity does not explain why some people get involved in politics and others do not. But the fact that activities can be arranged hierarchically and are quite interdependent leads to the expectation that general models of participation and recruitment could be developed. Milbrath (1965: 28-38) has developed a perceptually

oriented model of behavior which relates stimuli, personal factors, the political setting and social position to participation.[5] It is particularly helpful because it explains participatory behavior in terms of the complex, and sometimes circular, interaction of the individual's predispositions, experiences, and perceived environment. The model is a very general one, quite consistent with Schlesinger's ambition theory which, the reader may recall, is also implicitly based on perceptual psychology. For Milbrath, a decision is basically viewed as a function of physiological and psychological needs, beliefs, and attitudes, which can be called predispositions, and stimuli coming from the environment. Stimuli, however, are modified by "the selective effect of predispositions upon perceptions" (Milbrath, 1965: 33). When the concept of selective perception is combined with the notion of a predispositional threshold, one gains an understanding of why some persons participate in politics in certain ways and others do not. Thus, the individual who votes, but does not campaign, might find that his predispositions to political inactivity are reinforced by selective perceptions that campaigning is part of dirty politics, that no one needs or wants his help, or that any such effort would be largely ineffective anyway. It would take, as indicated earlier, a particularly strong push

from the environment, in other words, a stimuli that could not be ignored, or a combination of issues which might arouse sufficient counter-predispositions, to get the spectator to cross the gladiatorial threshold. On the other hand, an ambitious politician, whose predispositions favor active involvement, might conclude, on the basis of selective perception, that a real opportunity for election existed where such was not the case. In both examples, behavior feeds back to the individual, persumably altering his attitudes, needs, perceptions, and future participatory behavior.

Although a model of the general process of participation is somewhat helpful, the tendency to emphasize the individual's perceptual-motivational set means that the institutional framework within which leadership selection takes place is largely ignored. Political structures, such as parties, are defined as part of the environment, relevant only to the degree that they are perceived by individuals. While this may be an accurate picture of the motivational component, it ignores the active role of parties and other agents in recruiting leaders. What is needed is a framework of analysis that encompasses both the individual's psychological and sociological backgrounds and the several agents of recruitment.

Models of Political Recruitment

In recent years, there have been several suggestive attempts to conceptualize the process of leadership selection. In this regard, the writings of Seligman (1961, 1964), Sorauf (1963: 81-89), Jacob (1962), and Browning (1968) come readily to mind. None of these is entirely satisfactory, but taken together they lead to the conclusion that any comprehensive model must take account of at least four sets of variables: (1) the individual's psychological background, (2) his social background and career experiences, and the role of (3) party and (4) constituency in certification and selection.[6] Before discussing the relevant research findings in each of these areas, it may be helpful to look at two somewhat different ways in which to visualize the recruitment process.

No diagrammatic presentation could do complete justice to the complexities of political recruitment, but two partial schemes have proven helpful to this writer. First of all, recruitment can be looked at from the societal perspective as the successive narrowing of the relevant population as it passes through a series of funnels or filters (see Figure 1).[7] As shown in Figure 1, there are at least four selection structures which can be identified in the modern state system: (1) the formal



THE PROCESS OF CERTIFICATION

Figure 1

requirements, including the formally enunciated requirements for office such as age and citizenship, (2) the social structure, (3) the political structure, and (4) the opportunity structure.[8]

The process of certification, however, is really not a process at all, at least not as we have used it. Essentially, all it does is illustrate the idea that only a fraction of the total population meets the formal and informal requirements for public office. This is of course, a very important point. A recent study stressed the fact that:

> Even in the most democratic society, the electorate does not choose from among all its members. It chooses from among a pool of eligibles disproportionately drawn from the higher social-status groups in

> society; the availability of these elites as political candidates very much depends on the intramural maneuverings within the active stratum by which some are recruited to and others eliminated from candidacy (Prewitt and Eulau, 1971: 293).

Schlesinger (1966: 12) was even more succinct when he wrote that "It may be, as some have said, that today only millionaires can become President; but only those millionaires in strategic political posts can hope to turn the trick. In the game of politics the political as well as the social system determines the players." But more dynamic perspective is still needed, one that is process-oriented.

Figure 2, largely self-explanatory, is an attempt to visualize the sequential structure of political recruitment in terms of the mutual interaction, over a period of time, of the political environment, the potential candidate, and relevant political elites.[9] The political environment includes, among other things, the electoral constituency. The explicit inclusion of the constituency as a factor in recruitment is frequently neglected, but crucial to any model, such as this one, that has a concern for behavior in office, and, thus, for representation. Preceptually based, like Milbrath's more general model of participation, it is also consistent with ambition theory, although it is hardly limited to such an interpretation. It makes clear that candidates can be either "self-starters," or actively recruited by political



THE PROCESS OF POLITICAL RECRUITMENT[a]

Figure 2

[a]Partially based on a figure in Browning, R. (1968) "Hypotheses about Political Recruitment: a Partially Data-based Computer Simulation." In W. Coplin (ed.) Simulation in the Study of Politics. Chicago: Markham, p. 304.

leadership.[10] In either case, acceptance of nomination depends on the interaction between motivations and perceptions of opportunity and risk. Once elected, of course, the politician's office behavior has implications for his subsequent re-election.

A model of this type is probably the most satisfactory that can be produced at this time, but the skeletal relationships described above need to be filled in with substantive findings from relevant political research. To do this, we will return to the four sets of variables which were mentioned earlier: psychological background, social background and career experiences, and the role of party and constituency in candidate selection.

Factors in the Recruitment Process

Needs and Perceptions

Psychological factors have been largely neglected in the empirical study of political recruitment. This is unfortunate because they provide an important motivational component by relating individual needs and the perception of opportunities. What little research exists usually emphasizes the role of political office in fulfilling certain personality needs, such as the need for Power, Affiliation or Achievement (McConaughy, 1950; Jacob and Browing, 1964; George, 1968).[11] The role of perceptions in molding goals and behavior has

only been indirectly approached in the literature on political recruitment.[12]

The interaction of needs and the perception of opportunities for need satisfaction best explain the drive for public office. Early investigations of the drive for power failed to include a perceptual component and have been partially contradicted by later research. Weber (1958: 78) and Lasswell (1948: 39, 53), for example, hypothesized a drive for power as a significant characteristic of political activists and this thesis has received some support from a subsequent investigation of power motivations of South Carolina state legislators, since legislators had slightly higher dominance scores than a control group (McConaughy, 1950). But a more recent study of politicians holding a variety of positions in two states led to the conclusion that neither power, affiliative, nor achievement motivation was "peculiarly characteristic of the total sample of politicians tested" (Jacob and Browning, 1964: 81).

The apparent discrepancy in findings can be significantly reduced by controlling for the ability of a given political system to satisfy a given need. Thus, in the two-state study the authors found that men in positions with high power and achievement potential had higher motive scores than the nonpolitical control group or other politicians. Also, because opportunities for power achievement in politics were lower in Louisiana parishes

than in the eastern city studied, highly motivated persons were more typical of the latter sample. Significantly, the authors rejected a role socialization explanation, which would have suggested that exposure to power and achievement opportunities had socialized certain office-holders to high levels of power or achievement motivation, on the grounds that candidates for such positions had the same basic motivational characteristics as office-holders. Their conclusion is succinctly stated in the following logical hypothesis:

> Motivated behavior--for example, the choice of one activity over another less preferred--is the product of (1) the individual's underlying motivation, or need for a certain kind of satisfaction, and (2) his expectations or perception of motive satisfaction in the alternative activities (Jacob and Browning, 1964: 82).

This argument is quite consistent with ambition theory since "ambition" is only a catch-all term used to refer to a wide range of human wants and needs without making the investigator specify the wants and needs of any particular individual. Individual motivation mediated by perceptions of the environment propels some persons toward political candidacy. But other variables, particularly social background, help to explain why some individuals rather than others perceive political activity as a means of satisfying ambitions.

Social Background

Social background factors are operative at several

points in the process of political recruitment. First of all, background variables such as class, family, education, and occupation, predispose some persons to very high levels of political activity in the same way that they influence more common forms of participation like voting. A recent study of family relationships in Congress makes this quite clear (Clubok et al., 1969).[13] The authors, who discovered that a disproportionate number of congressmen had relatives who had also served in Congress, attributed this to the fact that they had "grown up in an environoment conducive to the internalization of political values, awareness, understanding and motivation" (1036).

Secondly social and occupational background can tell us a good deal about availability and skills. Two examples should suffice to illustrate the point. It has been found that British M. P.'s who eventually attained cabinet office entered politics at an earlier-than-average age (Buck, 1963). Their clear intention to make politics a career was probably helped along by limited family responsibilities and little, if any, commitment to an alternative occupation. But one's private occupation may be quite relevant to politics. The legal profession, particularly in the United States, is the example par excellence of a convergence of several factors--occupational flexibility, "brokerage" skills, and private advantage--which makes public officeholding both possible and attractive.

Occupational flexibility, which makes it relatively easy for professional persons, particularly lawyers, to serve in legislative bodies need not detain us here. The notion of occupational utility for politics, what Jacob calls "brokerage" occupations, is perhaps more significant, since it stands in partial contrast to a social structure explanation of recruitment. According to Jacob:

> Elected officials will come principally from brokerage occupations; as such occupations exist at all levels of the social hierarchy, elected officials may come from lower as well as upper status occupations (1962: 716).

The brokerage concept emphasizes the congruence of skills in private occupation and politics, particularly those skills central to the give-and-take of politics. But two additional points are relevant here. First of all, the brokerage concept can easily be stretched to include Schlesinger's idea that complementarity of functions can serve as a link between political offices (1966: 99). Even more important, in the German system where administrative norms seem particularly important, other skills may be more suitable (see, for example, Kirchheimer, 1966; Loewenberg, 1966: 107-108, 114).

Finally, in terms of occupational utility for politics, Eulau (1962: 507) has written that "just those individuals whose private pursuits qualify them for public office may also derive advantage from political status for their

private occupations." There is considerable evidence to support this conclusion. For example, Gold (1961) found that lawyers usually enter state legislatures at an early age and only stay for two or three terms, just long enough to derive significant private advantage. Similarly, Barber (1965: 23-66) speaks of the "advertisor" as one of four types of Connecticut legislators, characterized by high levels of activity, but a willingness to return for only a few sessions.

Jacob (1962) has suggested yet a third way in which social background is related to recruitment. An integral part of his model of recruitment is the community esteem of political office and he suggests that, just as water seeks its own level, "brokers will initially seek offices whose esteem corresponds most closely with their own standing in the community" (716).[14] Thus, a Boston Brahmin is unlikely to run for clerk of the circuit court, but quite likely to run for the U. S. House of Representatives of the Senate, as the examples of Lodge, Kennedy and Saltonstall will testify.

A final way in which social background factors enter the recruitment process is by being considered as relevant criteria by party and constituency as they go about the job of nominating and electing representatives. It is only when we consider these agents of recruitment that predictive propositions about leadership selection and various kinds of behavior are possible.

Party and Constituency

It is difficult to separate the operation of party and constituency in the process of political recruitment. Certainly the parties, whose concern is for electing candidates, select persons that will, at least in some ways, appeal to the voters or the major interests tied to the party (Loewenberg, 1966: 70-78). On the other hand, parties also try to pick candidates that meet their own needs (Sorauf, 1963: 81). This is particularly true where the party is organizationally strong and/or can count on victory at the polls (Mezey, 1970; Jacob, 1962: 716). Attempts to relate either party or constituency to recruitment almost always use traditional social background data such as prior political experience as dependent variables (Walker, 1960; Snowiss, 1966; Mezey, 1970). Since a much greater volume of research has been done on the role of the party in recruitment, it is to this literature that we turn first.

Using party competitiveness, variously measured, as the major independent variable, numerous investigators have found consistent relationships with three dependent variables: age, socio-economic status, and prior political experience. Given the obvious security and lower turnover rate of a predominant party, it is not surprising that parties in safe districts generally select older nominees than those in more competitive areas, or that

the youngest candidates are put forward by parties in a hopeless minority position (see Walker, 1960: 24-26; Snowiss, 1966). Youth is more likely to have the energy to wage an up-hill, or even a hopeless campaign, and also is more likely to derive private benefits from political exposure, regardless of electoral outcome.

Age, quite obviously, is somewhat correlated with the amount of political experience a person could have. Several studies would suggest that in dominant parties youth has to serve a long apprenticeship. Mezey (1970: 566) has found that successful majority party candidates are more likely to have held previous political office than successful minority party candidates. Similarly, Jacob (1962: 716) argues that where party organizations control nominations only those "brokers" who have contact with the machine will enter politics. But in the German case there was a serious lack of qualified party members to run for public office in the immediate post-war period. Until the parties, particularly the CDU, grew organizationally stronger even Bundestag seats were assigned to interest group representatives without a history of party activity (Heidenheimer, 1966: 71). Prior political experience, then, is something the parties would like candidates to have, provided that they are in a position to choose.

Findings about social status are less consistant. There seems to be a tendency for long-predominant parties

to have leadership that is heavily biased toward higher socio-economic groups (Patterson, 1963). This may reflect a bandwagon tendency on the part of upper-class elements, as well as the fact that older candidates, who are more numerous in dominant parties, have had a greater opportunity to advance socially and economically in their private lives. Partially counteracting this, however, is a tendency for parties to choose higher status candidates in competitive districts (Kornberg and Winsborough, 1968: 1242). Collectively, then, candidates in competitive districts are likely to be younger, upwardly mobile individuals, who may or may not be party regulars. The picture for their counterparts in noncompetetive districts is less structured: majority party nominees tend to be older party regulars; minority party candidates may be either young and inexperienced, or older, respected members of the community who can be talked into a token candidacy (see Snowiss, 1966).

Research on the role of the constituency in the process of political recruitment is exceedingly fragmentary. The underlying hypothesis for such research has been well stated by Rosenzweig (1957: 163) who argued that "it is likely that the characteristics of candidates for public office are determined in part by the character of the constituency in which they are running." There would also seem to be a natural tendency to stress the representational function at this point, by drawing inferences from

a comparison of the social backgrounds of politicians and their constituencies on the assumption that "the dominant values of the community result from its social characteristics, and these values are in turn imposed on all who would rise to positions of community leadership" (Sorauf, 1963: 89).

There is some evidence to support the view that officeholders do reflect their electorates in certain key dimensions. Sorauf, for example, found that candidates for public office in Pennsylvania resembled their constituency in terms of race, religion, and ethnic background (1963: 89). And Prewitt and Eulau (1971: 304) have found that the average status of city council members is positively related to the socio-economic level of the community, as measured by the median market value of homes. Similarly, other investigators have found that social groups supporting a particular party are heavily represented among that party's officials (Epstein, 1958: 89) or those seeking its nominations (Loewenberg, 1966: 67-68, 75-77; Varain, 1964).

Constituency is also relevant to recruitment in ways not so easily related to a vague definition of representation. Kornberg and Winsborough (1968: 1243), for example, found that relative urbanization and industrialization affected recruitment patterns by being positively related to the mean status of candidates. And Wences (1969: 181)

suggested that the higher the level of electoral participation, "the lower the proportion of political leaders recruited from business and legal occupations, but the higher the relative number recruited from other professions and from Labor and Party bureaucracies." These findings are at least partially explicable in terms of the concentration of wealth and status in areas of high population and the mobilization of the lower classes. Their significance, however, is far from evident and more research is needed to establish them as valid generalizations.

The importance of constituencies in political recruitment may vary with the structure of the electoral system, the organizational strength of political parties, and the tendency for constituents to vote for parties rather than candidates. Conditions in the United States would seem to maximize the potential impact of constituents, while those in Britain and Germany would reduce it. Differences, however, may not be as great as one might think. Austin Ranney (1968) finds that considerable localism does exist in British candidate selection, despite the fact that formal power of the national political party organizations are impressive. For Germany it has been pointed out that at least within the SPD "positions of leadership are widely held to require more and more the ability to deal with persons

outside the party," implying an increasing role for electoral constituencies (Chalmers, 1964: 160; see also Loewenberg, 1966: 83).

The role of constituents in political recruitment certainly deserves more study. By correlating demographic and electoral data for each Bundestag district with legislative career patterns we should be able to say something about the impact of constituencies on leadership selection. Previous work by this author (1969) would lead to the hypothesis that constituency candidates would have significantly different career patterns than list candidates, the latter probably reflecting interest group affiliation and state and national party experience. Similarly, there may be differences between one-party dominant districts and competetive or semicompetitive areas. Each of these ideas will be explored in later chapters.

Recruitment and Representation: Reflections on Outputs

Having looked at some of the ways in which constituency factors may affect political recruitment, it may be worthwhile to conclude this chapter on a reflective note. One of the most difficult tasks for this writer has been to conceptualize political recruitment in a comprehensive, yet unambiguous manner. Most of the literature on recruitment is conceptually inadequate, occasionally

irrelevant, and subject to searching criticism. Having grappled with this thorny problem for some time, several thoughts occur which should help to improve our understanding of the recruitment process, its possibilities . . . and its limitations.

Not all the research that has been conducted is irrelevant, or unimportant, despite the critics--far from it. The literature, taken as a whole, as we have tried to do in this chapter, provides a reasonably adequate understanding of the recruitment process. The difficulty is that only infrequently have scholars tried to conceptualize the total process. Instead, they have emphasized small, isolated segments: psychological factors, social background, or the role of political parties. Additionally, research has been divided very unevenly between even these gross categories, with most works devoted to easily ascertainable social background characteristics--often without any real thought as to how these features relate to political recruitment.

Two major problems are apparent upon examination. First of all, studies of <u>who</u> is recruited need to be distinguished from investigations of <u>how</u> persons are selected to fill leadership positions. In reality such a separation is somewhat artificial, but it helps to emphasize that those analyses of who is recruited are often unrelated to theory, being mere compendia of discrete

facts. Facts about who is recruited, usually social background material, are important because they stand for things that predispose people to high levels of political activity--interest, ability, knowledge, feelings of efficacy and similar factors. By themselves, however, they are static and descriptive; hardly an adequate approach to the dynamic process of getting persons elected to public office. For our purposes, recruitment is the study of how people get into positions of leadership. This is done by looking at the sequence of political officeholding.

A second problem arises because our interest in recruitment is often prompted by our concern for other kinds of political behavior; for a variety of outputs which can, supposedly, be related to who is recruited and how. Snowiss (1966: 627) stated the thesis simply when he wrote: "The study of recruitment and the study of representation are complementary." Complementary they may be, but identical they are not. Scholars have a normal desire to study significant objects, but students of political recruitment sometimes make exaggerated claims for their subject out of a failure to understand that factors operative in political recruitment may not operate identically in such closely related subject areas as roll call voting and representation.

When recruitment is taken as an independent variable, it is then related to some kind of dependent political

output--roll call voting (Atkins and Baer, 1970; Schulz, 1969), participation (Barber, 1965; Loewenberg, 1966; Hanna, 1965-66), system stability (Legg, 1969a; 1969b; Watson, 1969), or representational roles and attitudes (Bell and Price, 1969; Fiellin, 1967; Kochanek, 1968). But we should not expect to find, nor do we find, simple relationships between background factors and, for example, roll call votes, when we cannot even demonstrate a consistent connection between backgrounds and attitudes, variables which should be more closely connected (Edinger and Searing, 1967; Searing, 1969). Social and psychological backgrounds obviously have some bearing on political outputs, but they are mediated by party and constituency and it may be that apparently simple relationships are mere artifacts of other variables. Matthews (1954: 41), for example, indicates this may be the case for Rice's finding that farmers tended to vote together regardless of party. He suggests this may be an artifact of similar constituencies (Matthews, 1954: 41).

The tendency to consider recruitment and representation as one process is understandable in light of the fact that many of the same variables are operative: personality, social backgrounds, party and constituency. But a little thought should make it clear that they operate in different ways and in different combinations in what are essentially two separate processes. For example, the drive for power,

need for achievement and need for affiliation affect recruitment, but would not seem equally relevant to many kinds of political output. Certainly these are not attitudinal variables that should have any recognizable direct impact on roll call voting. Similarly, higher status individuals are more likely to be recruited to political activity, but this does not mean that they represent class interests or vote in a predictable manner. As Schlesinger (1966: 13) said, "the social or occupational composition of Congress is no guide to its voting behavior."[15] Most research emphasizes that party is the best explanatory variable for voting behavior and that residual variation can be explained by constituency factors, such as district "safeness" or "typicality" (MacRae, 1952; Froman, 1963: 110-121; Sorauf, 1963: 144-146).

Recruitment patterns can be related to certain kinds of behavior, but we should expect the more directly political experiences to have a greater impact. Thus, James Barber (1965: 237-240) has found that certain kinds of constituencies are likely to send individuals with personality needs that have implications for their level of political activity. For Germany, Loewenberg (1966: 107-121) has found that occupation is significantly related to performance in parliamentary debate. Finally, Schlesinger (1966: 5) has suggested that career patterns, which tell us what goals individuals in certain positions

may reasonably pursue, can be related to representative behavior through a very direct concern for getting one's self elected. Because the perspective is on careers, however, he quickly points out that the relevant constituencies may be differnt from the formal electoral constituency of the moment (1966: 5).

In the Bundestag it is not expected that recruitment patterns will be an important factor in explaining voting behavior, which is largely determined by party lines, although they might help explain vote deviancy (see Reuckert and Crane, 1962).[16] Nor is it assummed that recruitment patterns will be directly related to attitudes. But other, equally important, if less easily ascertainable relationships may exist, although they will not be considered as part of this study. As examples, one could cite the absolute level of legislative activity, legislative effectiveness, and representational role orientations. These should be fruitful areas for future research.

NOTES

1. Many of the examples are taken from the American context since a large proportion of the work has been done in this country. It is assumed that basic relationships are generally valid from one country to the next, although, of course, little reliance should be placed on precise figures. This is not an uncommon assumption. See, for example, Milbrath (1965: 19) and Prewitt and Eulau (1971: 294).

2. It must be emphasized that "initial recruitment" as used by these scholars is quite different from our decision to look at "initial Bundestag recruitment" patterns. As they have used it, the term would refer to the first political candidacy, or office, in an individual's background, which would normally be at the local or state-wide level.

3. Prewitt and Eulau (1971: 293) draw a distinction between "political recruitment" and "leadership selection," defining the former as a subset of the latter: "leadership selection refers to the processes that determine which few men from any generation will come to hold political office, and thus includes political socialization patterns, socio-economic bias, the formation of the politically active stratum, and the political opportunity structure." In this paper we have used the two terms interchangeably. What they refer to as "leadership selection" more closely resembles those processes of political socialization and participation which will be discussed in the next section of this chapter.

4. This section is heavily based on Milbrath (1965). He has managed to draw together in concise, readable form most of the literature on political participation and to systematize the findings. This writer was interested to note that his own attempt to organize the literature on political recruitment led to an emphasis on a similar set of factors.

5. See particularly Milbrath's (1965: 28) diagrammatic representation of the model.

6. The terms "certification" and "selection" are Seligman's (1961). Certification includes basically those factors of social screening and political channeling that Prewitt and Eulau (1971: 293) refer to as "leadership selection." Selection resembles their definition of "political recruitment."

7. For a somewhat similar scheme see Prewitt's (1970: 8) "Chinese box puzzle" which is a further attempt to describe "The successive narrowing of the many who are governed to the few who govern."

8. A distinction is not always made between the political structure and the opportunity structure. As used here, the political structure refers to the structure of the political parties, the electoral system and similar factors, while the opportunity structure is concerned with the number of opportunities, the amount of inter- and intra-party competition and the extent of multiple-officeholding.

9. The author is happy to acknowledge the influence of Seligman (1967: 295), Milbrath (1965: 2) and Browning (1968: 304) on his visual conceptualization of the recruitment process.

10. Seligman (1961: 86) identifies four patterns of candidate recruitment: (1) conscription, (2) self-recruitment, (3) co-optation and (4) agency.

11. A good summary of the personality and politics literature can be found in Greenstein (1968). The entire issue of Journal of Social Issues in which Greenstein's article appears is devoted to the topic. See also footnote references in Milbrath (1965: Ch. 3).

12. An exception is Jacob and Browning (1964). Also relevant are George (1968) and Kingdon (1968).

13. See also Bowman and Boynton (1966), Kornberg and Thomas (1965) and Wahlke et al. (1962: Ch. 4).

14. A somewhat similar thesis, although applied from a systemic rather than individual perspective, has been used by Prewitt and Eulau (1971: 302) who argue that city council members in the Bay Area are drawn exclusively from persons above the sixtieth percentile in the social-status hierarchy of their community, but that the absolute value of that percentile shifts from one community to another.

15. For a conflicting interpretation see Donald Matthews (1954: 40).

16. A recent article has explored precisely this point by relating the voting cohesion of the British Conservative party to three constraints against deviancy: potential career vulnerability, career enhancement aspirations, and feelings of group or party identity. The second constraint, career enhancement aspirations, appears to be very similar to Schlesinger's idea of progressive ambitions. It is operationalized in terms of acquisition of higher office, the length of Commons membership, and age, all of which are important career variables. See Schwarz and Lambert (1971).

CHAPTER 3

THE SETTING

The Federal Republic is a relatively new entity built upon the ruins of the Third Reich. Its constitution, the Basic Law, was only adopted May 23, 1949 and it was not until May 5, 1955 that the last vestages of military occupation, with the continuing exception of Berlin, were removed.[1] It would be a mistake, however, to view the German political system as essentially a new creation, for it exhibits striking continuities with the past. Kirchheimer (1950) and Edinger (1961) have found significant similarities in elite recruitment since the Weimar period. Even more recently, the sociologist Ralf Dahrendorf (1969: 285-296) has criticized the continued predominance of "private virtues" even "public virtues." And the philosopher Karl Jaspers (1967: 22-28), in a thoughtful polemic on the possibly totalitarian direction of German politics, has stressed that the old faults remain: political passivity and a lack of commitment to individual freedom and democracy. Perhaps more than most nations, Germany is clearly the product of its unique historical experiences, particularly the devastating defeat in two World Wars, the abortive Weimar experiment in democracy and the excesses of the Hitlerian era.

The purpose of this chapter is to outline key aspects of political life in Germany as a foundation for understanding parliamentary recruitment. Beginning with a brief sketch of the development and historical role of parliaments in Germany, it moves on to consider how the formative experiences mentioned above have helped to shape the electoral system, the structure of government and the political parties. This is followed by a discussion of certain aspects of contemporary political culture that are particularly relevant to recruitment. Finally, some consideration is given to the present role of the Bundestag which, like other parliamentary bodies, is relatively less powerful than the executive branch of government.

The Historical Role of Parliament

The Bundestag has a long, but not particularly distinguished ancestry. The parliamentary tradition can be traced back to the Imperial Diet or Reichstag of the Holy Roman Empire which developed during the tenth to twelfth centuries (Ullmann and King-Hall, 1954: 19-33) and to the Estates of the various principalities, such as Württemberg, which began to form throughout Germany during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries (Carsten, 1963; Ullmann and King-Hall, 1954: 33-36).[2]

The Imperial Diet, which lasted until the time of Napoleon, was not a true parliamentary body, but rather

"an aristocracy of soverign princes" (Ullmann and King-Hall, 1954: 27). The relations of Emperor and princes depended "on the possessions of the family, not on their rank and status" (Ullmann and King-Hall, 1954: 27). Although never exercising great influence as an organization, by the eighteenth century it had deteriorated still further into a conference of envoys and charges d'affaires, devoting much time to such questions as the proper date for celebrating Easter (Ullmann and King-Hall, 1954: 32).

This is in some contrast to the diets of the various German principalities which were clearly embryonic legislative institutions. While based on Estates, on occasion the clergy or nobility were excluded and, somewhat less frequently, the peasants allowed to participate (Carsten, 1963: 423-424). At times these diets exercised great influence because of their pivotal role in succession conflicts and their legal right to grant taxes. "In the sixteenth century the powers of many German Estates, in the fields of finance, foreign policy, and military affairs, were considerably greater than those of the English Parliament" (Carsten, 1963: 442). By the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, however, the issues which led to the rise of the Estates had declined in importance with the spread of primogeniture, standing armies, and long-term taxation privileges granted to the princes. With these changes came a marked decline in the importance

of the Estates in Hesse, Saxony, Bavaria and the duchies on the Rhine. Only in Württemberg were the Estates able to maintain their position, and this largely because of the timely death of several dukes (Carsten, 1963: 147).

The impact of these feudal institutions on later developments is quite diffuse. The provincial diets, according to Loewenberg (1966: 5), served as training grounds for the first generation of German parliamentarians, the members of the Frankfurt Assembly. Carsten (1963: 444) credits them with preserving "the spirit of constitutional government and liberty in the age of absolute monarchy." Their relevance to post-war Germany, however, seems limited to the class-based role orientation found in public attitudes toward the Bundestag, notably in the concept of the member as interest representative (Loewenberg, 1966: 44-46).

In the aftermath of the French Revolution, more modern constitutions were granted in many German states, including Saxe Weimar, Brunswick and Hanover (Ullmann and King-Hall, 1954: 41; Pinson, 1966: 61). Although suffrage was limited and their powers circumscribed, these bodies helped to foster the growth of the "national and liberal spirit" which came to the fore in the revolutionary atmosphere of 1848 (Ullmann and King-Hall, 1954: 42; Pinson, 1966: 81). The German Revolution of 1848 and the Frankfurt Parliament which resulted from it are turning points in German History. "It remained the starting

point for all subsequent movements to democratize Germany and it was accepted as the prototype of the Weimar Republic by the republican leaders of 1918 to 1933" (Pinson, 1966: 81). The failure of the Frankfurt Parliament was also to foreshadow the failure of the Weimar Republic.

Begun amidst tremendous enthusiasm, the Frankfurt Assembly perished a year later "like a prostitute in a tavern" (Ullman and King-Hall, 1954: 57). Sometimes characterized as a Professorenparlament for its inability to climb down from the ivory towers of academia to deal with the real political issue of German unification, Eyck (1968: 95-96) shows clearly that it was, above all, "a lawyers' parliament." Table 1 lists the occupational composition of the body and clearly shows its upper-middle class bias. Almost all were members of the professions, although about 20 per cent rose to these ranks from comparatively humble origins (Eyck, 1968: 97). There was not a single member from a working-class background (Ullmann and King-Hall, 1954: 49).

The Frankfurt Parliament's failure to unify Germany ended with a counter-revolutionary victory that had serious implications for the future of democratic institutions. Despite the lack of success, however, the Assembly marks the beginning of Germany's genuine parliamentary development--developments which can be traced to the modern Bundestag. Loewenberg (1966: 5) points out, for example,

TABLE 1

OCCUPATIONAL COMPOSITION OF THE FRANKFURT PARLIAMENT[a]

Occupation	Percentage of Members N=799
Civil Servants (includes judiciary & military)	36.5
Lawyers	16.3
University or School Teachers	15.4
Businessmen	9.4
Landowners	8.5
Clergy	5.6
Writers, Journalists	4.5
Medical Practitioners	3.1
Not Yet in Profession	0.2
Not Known	0.5

[a]Adapted from Eyck, F. (1968). The Frankfurt Parliament, 1848-1849. London: Macmillan, p. 95.

that it was in the Frankfurt Assembly that embryonic parties first developed in caucuses among like-minded members; that fundamentals of parliamentary procedure were hammered out; and that the first draft of constitutional provisions for a national parliament based on universal suffrage was written. Eyck (1968: 395) has correctly concluded that "the tragedy of the moderate liberals in 1848 was that they had responsibility without sufficient power"; it could hardly have been otherwise in a situation where two vital issues, national unification and the creation of national representative institutions, had to be solved simultaneously.[3] But the real tragedy was Germany's because unification eventually took place through the auspices of the vigorous foreign policy of the "Iron Chancellor," Otto von Bismarck, rather than by orderly, constitutional processes.

After 1871 the Reichstag was placed at the center of the national stage, but effectively deprived of power in what Loewenberg (1966: 10) calls the "artfully constructed chaos which characterized the constitutional system of the German Empire." The concept of parliamentary responsibility was not established and the Reichstag, torn by constant bickering and procedural disputes, failed to distinguish itself. The following description of the Reichstag in the Bismarchkean era illustrates its role at that time:

> It is not surprising that a Reichstag of so little weight and with such limited rights could not win much prestige, and it was soon nicknamed "Quasselbude," which may be politely translated as "chatterbox." Government circles derided it at will. In later years a reactionary landowner of the Prussian Diet remarked that the Emperor should be able to disperse it with the help of a lieutenant and ten privates. William II called its members "a bunch of fools" and boasted after twenty years' rule that he had never even read the Constitution (Ullmann and King-Hall, 1954: 72).

Even those few occasions when the Reichstag could reasonably have asserted itself, as in the Daily Telegraph Affair and the voting of war credits in 1914, came to naught. It was only as the First World War was drawing to a close that a semblance of responsibility was established through the government's submission of reports on the state of hostilities to an interparty committee and the elevation of some members of this committee to ministerial positions (Loewenberg, 1966: 18).

It is unforturnate that the most democratic system of government Germany had ever known came into being as the result of the collapse of the old order in the wake of military defeat. Throughout its brief life the Weimar Republic and its major supporters, the center and moderate left parties, labored under the Dolchstoss myth.[4] The full story of the collapse of the Weimar Republic cannot be told here, but certainly relevant to the eventual Nazi take-over were: (1) Allied policy after 1918, (2) economic conditions in the Reich after 1928, and (3) certain political deficiencies (see, for example, Black and Helmreich, 1959: 445-446). It is the political deficiencies that are relevant to the present discussion. Briefly speaking, the Reichstag of the Weimar Republic was to be the major legislative organ, exercising control over the government through parliamentary responsibility. The Reichstag was directly elected by the people from party lists on a strictly proportional basis. The result of the electoral system was a very accurate reflection of the political fragmentation in the society at large. Consequently, the number of narrow, ideological parties was large, minimizing the prospects for political compromise. While it would be an overstatement to say that the system of proportional representation caused political fragmentation, it certainly did nothing to improve the situation. It was extremely difficult under the circumstances for the Reichstag to create governments or to carry out its legislative functions.

Loewenberg (1966: 22) calls this syndrome "parliamentary immobilisme," clearly reflected in the fact that only eight of the twenty cabinets formed during the Republic enjoyed majority support. Another important feature of the Weimar system was the independent election of the President who enjoyed important emergency powers, notably the possibility of governing through presidential decrees under Article 48 of the Constitution. This power was used extensively after 1930.

Black and Helmreich (1959: 447) point out that it would be incorrect to overemphasize the importance of political factors, such as the system of proportional representation and the emergency powers granted to the President, in the collapse of the Republic (1959: 447). But the role of these factors in the deliberations of the Parlamentarischerat of 1948-49 as it went about the task of rebuilding the political order can hardly be overestimated.

The Founding of the Federal Republic

Unlike the First World War, Germany was totally defeated, psychologically and militarily in 1945. Perhaps most significantly, the administrative apparatus had collapsed at all levels making possible, and necessary, a vast restructuring of political life. Reconstruction proceeded at varying paces and in somewhat different directions in the three Western zones, due to the conflict-

ing priorities of the Allies (Golay, 1958: 5-17; Merkl, 1963: 7-15). The rift between East and West, which widened after the Potsdam Conference, initially intensified the tendency for each power to proceed separately, but eventually led to the realization that unification of the Western zones was essential for the economic recovery of Europe and as a bulwark against Soviet expansion. By September, 1946 a number of agreements between American and British authorities led to the establishment of a Bizonal Economic Council with authority over the Laender. It was in this atmosphere that a conference of the three Western powers and the Benelux countries meeting in London from February to June, 1948 agreed to establish a West German state. A Parliamentary Council, the Parlamentarischerat, composed of sixty-five delegates selected by the Landtage under guidelines established by the Ministers-President was charged with drafting a provisional constitution for the new republic. Meeting from September 1, 1948 until May 8, 1949 the Basic Law with its numerous compromises was hammered out in the Parliamentary Council and ratified by the several Landtage May 16-22, 1949. It was officially proclaimed May 23, 1949.

Such a sketchy introduction, of course, does not do justice to the complexity of issues involved. It does suggest the central role of German politicians, however, in creating the Federal Republic, despite Allied participation in the deliberations at several important

points.

> . . . it would be very much amiss to think that the frail young sprout of postwar German democracy grew from an Allied seed . . . . Owing to these conditions, democracy and federalism were a natural German choice long before the Western Allies chose to include them in the London Agreements among the specifications for a West German constitution (Merkl, 1963: 21).

The validity of this thesis can best be seen by examining critical aspects of the structure of government, the electoral system, and the political parties today.

The Structure of Government

Government in Germany is organized at three basic levels, local, Land and national, with legislative and executive organs at each. Local government structure varies considerably from one Land to another, depending upon tradition and the differing conceptions of the proper form for local government held by the three Western Allies. The British, for example, sought to abolish the power of the Bürgermeister, or mayor, and established a council-manager system in North Rhine-Westphalia and Lower Saxony, where administrative powers are centered in a non-political Gemeindedirektor. The Americans largely accepted the prevalent council-mayor system in their zone; hence, the mayor remains the chief administrative official in Bavaria and Baden-Württemberg. In all, Heidenheimer identifies five types of local government, the most important not previously mentioned being the collegial systems used

by the city-states of Hamburg, Bremen and West Berlin (Heidenheimer, 1966: 178-180; see also Hiscocks, 1957: 171-185; Legislative, Exekutive, Rechtsprechung, 1967: 40-41).

Between the Gemeinden and the Laender stand the Landkreise, or counties. The larger cities are usually administered separately from the rural and small town areas as stadtkreise or Kreise-frei Städte, combining local and county functions. In the less populous areas, however, the Kreis and its leading organs, the Kreistag (county council) and Landrat (county director) form a distinct intermediate governmental unit. The structure of county government varies from region to region in roughly the same manner as local government.

Local and county governments exercise very limited legislative responsibility but are charged with a major share of administrative duties. They have proven to be an extremely important training ground for Land and national politicians, as we shall see in subsequent chapters.

The political structure of the Laender resembles in basic form that of the federal government. All except Bavaria have a unicameral parliament elected by some variety of proportional representation. In Bavaria there is a second chamber, the Senat, where interests are directly represented as in the old Estate-based diets. The government of each Land is composed of a Minister-President and a cabinet, usually formed through a coalition

of several parties. Although the policy-making powers of the Laender are more limited than under the Empire or in the Weimar Republic, they continue to play an important role in national politics for at least three reasons. First, they are an important stepping-stone to national political office. Second, because the composition of Laender governments determines the make up of the Bundesrat (the second chamber of the federal government), coalition changes can have important implications for national legislation. Finally, the fact that landtag elections are staggered throughout the years between Bundestag elections has tended to make them into continuing referendums on the performance of the federal government.

It is in the relations between the levels of government, particularly in the relations between the central institutions and the Laender, that one can most clearly see the indigenous character of the present political system. According to Article 20 of the Basic Law, the Federal Republic of Germany is a "democratic and social federal state" composed of eleven Laender (see Table 2). Federalism in Germany is one example of the happy coincidence of the interests of the occupation powers in avoiding another unitary and potentially totalitarian state, the feeling that some of the problems of the Weimar Republic were due to "the progressive abandoning of the old German tradition of federalism" (Merkl, 1963: 23), and the vested

interest of Laender governments and parties in preserving their political position (Golay, 1958: 41-44; Merkl, 1963: 28-50).

TABLE 2

THE LAENDER OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Land	Population (1969)[a]	Number of Bundesrat seats
Baden-Württemberg	8,822,000	5
Bavaria	10,490,000	5
Bremen	755,000	3
Hamburg	1,819,000	3
Hesse	5,379,000	4
Lower Saxony	7,067,000	5
North Rhine-Westphalia	17,039,000	5
Rhineland-Palatinate	3,659,000	4
Saarland	1,129,000	3
Schleswig-Holstein	2,547,000	4
West Berlin	2,135,000	4

[a]Based on the 1969 micro-census as reported in Handbook of Statistics (1970). Wiesbaden: Federal Statistical Office, p. 16.

German federalism, however, is considerably different from the American variety. Merkl (1963) refers to it as "executive-legislative federalism," while Golay (1958: 44) chooses to call it "functional federalism," since it tends to preserve the strong role of central institutions in decision-making while devolving most administrative functions upon the Laender and local governments. K. C. Wheare (1953: 136-146), one of the leading students of federalism, concludes, in contrast, that it is not really a federal system at all, but an example of a decentralized

unitary state, since the Laender lack a significant measure of independence (1953: 136-146).[5] However one resolves the semantic issue, it is clear that German federalism is an outgrowth of traditional regional sentiments, the reaction against the increased centralization of the preceding century which had twice ended in defeat, and the vested interests of previously established Land-level governments and party organizations.[6]

> The federal order of the Basic Law, as it finally took form, is essentially a German construction. It follows the German tradition, with adaptations to take account of contemporary conditions and to accommodate varying interests and political views in Western Germany today (Golay, 1958: 108).

The Electoral System

The electoral law adopted by the Parliamentary Council is a modified version of proportional representation which, in the view of its supporters, was consistent with German political traditions (Golay, 1958: 139). The basic features of the law as it presently operates are as follows:[7] Every voter casts two separate ballots, one for a constituency candidate, the other for a party list drawn up by the Land parties. Plurality decides the 248 constituency contests and an equal number of list seats are filled from the Land lists by a complex mathematical formula devised by the nineteenth century Belgian mathematician d'Hondt. The system is basically proportional because the total number of seats each party is entitled to is

determined by its share of the second ballot. The number of direct mandates is subtracted from this total and the remaining seats distributed between the separate Land lists on the basis of their contribution to the party's total vote. There are only two exceptions to the proportionality of the system. The first is a requirement that a party must receive at least 5 per cent of the vote in at least one Land, or win three constituency seats in order to benefit from the proportional distribution of Bundestag seats. This has tended to eliminate minor parties who cannot hope to win direct seats or clear the 5 per cent hurdle (see Table 3). The second exception is that a party can gain more seats than it is entitled to on the basis of proportionality, but only by winning a greater number of direct mandates than its proportional share of seats in a Land. These extra mandates are added to the total number of Bundestag seats allotted to the Land and the distribution recalculated by the d'Hondt system, partially explaining the fluctuation in total seats (see Table 3).[8] This second exception is less important than the first, there being only thirteen of these "super-proportional" mandates through 1965, all but two being won by the CDU (Loewenberg, 1966: 16, note 39).

One can reasonably ask why Germany reverted to proportional representation, a widely criticized feature of the Weimar system because it perpetuated a large number of minority parties. Golay (1958: 138) makes clear that

TABLE 3

THE DISTRIBUTION OF BUNDESTAG SEATS BY PARTY 1949-1969[a]

Party	1949	1953	1957	1961	1965	1969
Christian Democratic/ Christian Social Union	141	250	278	251	251	250
Social Democratic Party	136	162	181	203	217	237
Free Democratic Party	53	53	43	67	50	31
German Party	17	15	17			
Bavarian Party	17					
Communist Party	15					
Economic Reconstruction Union	12					
Center Party	10					
Refugee Party		27				
South Schleswig Voters' Assn.	1					
German Rightist Party	5					
Others	3	2				
Total	410	509	519	521	518	518

[a]Includes 8 nonvoting Representatives from Berlin in 1949 and 22 at each successive election.

the answer lies in the vested interests of some political parties. Basically speaking, the minor parties, the Free Democrats and the Social Democrats, favored a system of proportional representation since it would maximize their representation. The CDU/CSU, on the other hand, strongly favored a straight single-member plurality system which would clearly have operated to their advantage, given their overall strength and relatively even distribution throughout the Laender.

The compromise which resulted from the political process in the Parliamentary Council strongly favored the weaker

parties. The CDU/CSU had to accept a fifty-fifty distribution of seats between single-member districts and party lists and there was no provision hindering the smaller groups. This compromise, however, was modified by the Ministers-President at the behest of the military governors. Instead of a fifty-fifty system, the proportion was to be sixty-forty.[9] More important, however, was the Allied insistance on a 5 per cent "hurdle" to be leaped before any party could be represented in the Bundestag.[10] Clearly an attempt to limit the fractionalization of a multi-party system, it is the most direct example of foreign intervention in the domestic political process.

> In fact, the law as it finally took effect was essentially a military government enactment, for it was promulgated by the ministers-president, over widespread party opposition, at the direct order of the military governors, relying upon their "supreme authority" (Golay, 1958: 139).

Although the parties were critical of Allied intervention at the time, they have not sought to modify the most important change introduced by the military governors, the 5 per cent clause, except to make it still more difficult for minor parties to gain national representation. There have been numerous attempts to revise the electoral system, notably by converting to a single-member district system, but these efforts have been unsuccessful. The latest series of attempts foundered on the SPD's belief that its minority position would be perpetuated and the

FDP's undoubtedly correct analysis that change would spell its death-knell, since it has virtually no chance of winning direct mandates (see Conradt, 1970: 346-348). One of the conditions for the current SPD/FDP coalition is maintenance of the present electoral system (see Conradt, 1970: 355). All of which simply points to the fact that despite initial allied intervention, the electoral system meets certain domestic needs and is, to that degree, a product of Germany's political development.

The Political Parties

Schlesinger (1966: 19) has stressed that any analysis of political opportunities must give attention to the role of political parties in structuring officeholding: "The party is, after all, the most conspicuous organization whose primary purpose is the control of the opportunities for public office." The purpose of this section is to briefly examine the organizational structure of the two major parties on the assumption that parties "do not affect opportunities primarily by their competetive relations . . . (but rather) by their organization" (Schlesinger, 1966: 119).

Figure 3 outlines the basic structural relationships in the CDU/CSU and SPD. The CDU/CSU is composed of 397 Kreisverbaende which are the basic units. Below the Kreis are any number of local organizations called Ortsverbaende, established at the convenience of the Kreisverbaende. Above the county unit are 18 Landesverbaende, the highest unit of importance below the national party organization. The



THE STRUCTURE OF THE POLITICAL PARTIES

Figure 3

Landesverbaende do not coincide with the present geographical boundaries of the states, but tend to follow older, more traditional boundaries. Thus, in Lower Saxony, there are three Landesverbaende, Braunschweig, Hannover and Oldenburg, corresponding to the old Laender that were lumped into one state after World War II.

In the SPD the Bezirk, or district, is the major organizational unit below the national level. There are 22 Landesverbaende and Bezirkverbaende, roughly corresponding to the secondary CDU units, although there is less tendency to follow traditional geographical boundaries. The smallest unit of the party is the Ortsverein or, in the cities, the Stadtteilorganisation. In 1967 there were 9717 of these local bodies (Jahrbuch der SPD, 1966/67, c. 1967: 163). The Unterbezirke are intermediate bodies, subordinate to the Bezirke, but participating with it in the selection of the Parteitag, nominally the highest organ in the party.

The central role of the parties in the political life of Germany is well illustrated by their control of the Parliamentary Council and its major outputs, the Basic Law and the electoral statute (Merkl, 1963: 55, 91; Golay, 1958: 138-158). Unlike the American Constitution, political parties are explicitly mentioned in Article 21 of the Basic Law, thus achieving a legal, as well as political and sociological position (Apel, 1969: 114-117).[11] The deep distrust of mass democracy and the common man which was felt by the small minority of political activists in the

immediate postwar period led to an attempt to "reconstruct democracy without the demos" (Merkl, 1963: 176). The indirect election of a weakened President, the "constructive vote of no confidence," and the basically proportional character of the electoral system are clear examples of this trend.

The German party system and the political parties themselves bear little resemblance to the situation during the Imperial or Weimar eras. First of all, the trend is clearly toward a two-party system (see Table 3), despite a proportional electoral law.[12] Secondly, the major parties are moderate, nonideological, interest "aggregators," rather than narrow interest "articulators" (Edinger, 1968: 280-281). The prospects for political compromise and system stability are enhanced under these conditions, making possible, for example, the "Grand Coalition" of CDU/CSU and SPD which was in power from 1966 to 1969, and the SPD/FDP coalition since that date.

Stability has been achieved, however, only at the cost of electoral accountability and intra-party democracy. This is a harsh charge, but one that is frequently implicit, if not explicit, in the analysis of the German political system (see, for example, Edinger 1968: 266; Loewenberg, 1966: 67-70; Apel, 1969: 210; Heidenheimer, 1966: 120; Dahrendorf, 1969: 252-265).[13] As concerns intra-party democracy, it is not necessary to dissect the organizational structure of the two parties in any great detail to

discover that both are led by relatively small, overlapping elites of party and government. Advancement within party ranks is usually limited to executive committee members serving at the next lower level in the party hierarchy (see, for example, Mayntz, 1961). And in both parties the executive committee or presidium is largely composed of federal ministers, Bundestag Deputies, Land ministers, and Landtag members (Jahrbuch der SPD, 1966/67, c. 1967: 228; Politisches Jahrbuch der CDU und CSU Deutschlands, 1968, 1968: 2-3).

As for electoral accountability, it is apparent that the parties are not instruments of their broad membership, much less the voters, but are tools of leadership.[14] The following extensive quotation from Karl Jaspers' The Future of Germany summarizes the basic arguments with a power and perceptiveness unequaled by other commentators.

> The authors of the Basic Law seem to have dreaded the people, for the constitution holds the people's power to a minimum. Every four years they elect the lower house of parliament, the Bundestag, from lists of persons previously chosen by the parties. This hidden primary election is the real election, the one that decides not only who goes on his party's list but who goes high enough on it to be assured of a seat in the Bundestag under our system of proportional representation. The process is an involved one, with nominations for district and state lists handled in different manners. But it is always the party organizations that control this crucial first step, never the people. To participate in the primary election, or to be nominated for it, one must have joined a party.
>
> Party members do not have much influence on nominations either. The

> decisive choices are made by the party hierarchy and bureaucracy. In drawing up state lists, a party member as such has no voice at all.
>
> To be a voter in the full sense of the word, participating from nomination to general election, you must join a party. Unless you do, you cannot complain if all you get to vote upon is what the parties hand you. You elect people who have been elected already, and your vote affects only the number of party choices who will sit in the Bundestag (1967: 3-4).

Heidenheimer (1966: 120) put it more simply when he wrote "Even convinced democrats have reluctantly come to accept that the German definition of democracy tends to mean 'government for the people' more than it does 'government by the people.'"

Political Culture and Political Participation

The political parties were able to gain and maintain their pivotal position in the political system, in part, because of traditional attitudes of deference towards authority and political passivity (see Dahrendorf, 1969: 63-77, 99-112, 314-327). In the aftermath of war it was understandable that a large proportion of the population, between 60 and 70 per cent in the years 1947 to 1949 would prefer to leave political affairs to others (see Merritt and Merritt, 1970: 43-50). More recent public opinion polls, however, indicate a continuing lack of interest in politics (see Hartenstein and Schubert, 1961: 18, 22; Almond and Verba, 1965: 79). In 1967, 39 per cent

of survey respondents said they were interested in politics, while 44 per cent said they were "not especially" interested in the subject and 17 per cent expressed no interest at all (Institut für Demoskopie, 1967: Table 7). Similarly, 78 per cent of respondents in a 1965 survey rejected personal political activity, while only 15 per cent said they would like to be active or were already political participants (Institut für Demoskopie, 1967: Table 1).

There have been several suggestive attempts to quantify levels of political participation in Germany and to arrange them hierarchically in a manner resembling Milbrath's (1965: 18) diagram (see Edinger, 1968: 168; Hartenstein and Liepelt, 1962). Their most striking feature is the apparent void in participation that exists between the act of voting and what can reasonably be called gladiatorial activities. It is in the middle-range political activities, such as initiating political discussions, contacting public officials, and joining civic-political organizations that German democracy seems particularly weak.[15] In the last Bundestag elections, for example, 86 per cent of eligible voters exercised their franchise, while in the preceding Landtag elections about 77 per cent of the electorate voted. These rates are high compared to the United States, but participation drops off sharply as one climbs the hierarchy of political involvement. A 1966 survey revealed that just 11 per cent of respondents had ever written a letter to the editor (Institut für Demoskopie, 1967: Table 9)

and Edinger (1968: 168) estimated that only 9 per cent of the population attends meetings on public affairs, while just 3 per cent are active in politics (1968: 168). In comparative terms, Almond and Verba found that only 3 per cent of their German sample but 11 per cent of the American group were involved in civic-political organizations (1965: 247).

Political culture is an important variable affecting the amount and kind of participation. Attitudes toward political activity continue to fall short of democratic ideals, particularly as defined by the term "civic culture," a qualitative interpretation of democracy that emphasizes both formal participation and the degree of commitment and orientation to political objects (Almond and Verba, 1965: 29-30). Americans have a strong sense of civic duty, high levels of political efficacy, and frequently take an active role in group affairs (Almond and Verba, 1965: 313). On the other hand, Almond and Verba see the German system as "subject" rather than "participant" oriented:

> Awareness of politics and political activity, though substantial, tends to be passive and formal . . . norms favoring active political participation are not well developed (1965: 312).

The act of voting is carried out from a sense of duty, not interest, and little satisfaction is attached to it (see DIVO-Institut, 1962: 131; Almond and Verba, 1965: 193).

Thus, for most Germans, political participation is limited to the intermittent act of voting, reflecting the continuing contrast between "private" and "public" virtues (see Dahrendorf, 1967: 285-296) and foreshadowing the crucial role played by oligarchic parties in the recruitment process. Dahrendorf has summarized the situation admirably in the concluding remarks of his chapter on "the unpolitical German":

> This means that the political sphere of life remains alien to people, stuck on like political education in the classical grammar school. So far as the habits of people is concerned, the area below the ritual act of voting is empty after all, that is, not filled with activities of immediate political relevance experienced as significant by the individual. The political socialization of the German is incomplete. . . .
>
> . . . This effect is expressed above all in the quality of political behavior. Democratic institutions are accepted; but they remain external, distant, ultimately irrelevant (1969: 325-326).

At the very least, contemporary attitudes toward political activity significantly reduce the number of potential "gladiators"; at the worst they reflect an underlying instability in the system. Under these circumstances the virtual necessity of "government for the people" is readily apparent.

The Role of the Bundestag and the Individual Deputy

All of the previously discussed factors--parliamentary traditions, the totalitarian experience, military defeat and occupation, political passivity, the electoral system

and the parties--are mutually interactive. Furthermore, they collectively define the contemporary role of parliamentary institutions in Germany. The Bundestag is definitely inferior, both in the quality of its average member and in political power, to the Chancellor and the various ministries.

> The Basic Law formally distributes the power to initiate, deliberate, and enact public policy among executive and parliamentary structures. In practice, however, the Bundesregierung has consistently been dominant in formulating policy, the Bundesrat increasingly influential, and the Bundestag of diminishing effectiveness (Edinger, 1968: 298).

One indication of the relation between the Govern--ment and the Lower House of Parliament is given by the physical layout of the Bundeshaus, where members of the government are seated in a slightly raised dias, the Regierungsbank, facing the main body of the chamber. This dias has recently been lowered from a height of 70 cm. above floor level to just 18.5 cm. above the rest of the chamber, but continues to reflect the traditional relationship between Government and Parliament in Germany (see Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, August 2, 1969: 3). Another indicator is the lack of a significant research establishment devoted exclusively to the legislative branch, due to the prestige of the executive bureaucracy and the existence of extensive party bureaucracies (Loewenberg, 1966: 54-55). Perhaps the most significant indicator is

the initiating source of legislation. Table 4 shows the amount of legislation initiated by the government, the Bundestag, and the Bundesrat in the first five electoral periods (1949-1969). Most legislation (56.1 per cent) originated with the executive departments, although the Bundestag still had the opportunity to revise and refine, or even reject the proposals. Even more revealing, however, is the source of bills which eventually became law. In the fifth session 80.7 per cent of all successful bills originated in the government (see Statistisches Jahrbuch für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 1970: 115).

TABLE 4

THE INITIATION OF LEGISLATION

	Bundesregierung	Bundestag	Bundesrat	Total
First period (1949-1953)[a]	486	301	29	816
Second period (1953-1957)[a]	442	414	16	872
Third period (1957-1961)[a]	391	207	5	603
Fourth period (1961-1965)[a]	373	245	8	626
Fifth period (1965-1969)[b]	415	225	14	654
Total	2,107	1,392	72	3,571

[a]As listed in Walper, K. (1966). Föderalismus. Nos. 22/23, Zur Politik und Zeitgeschichte. Berlin: Landeszentrale für politische Bildungsarbeit Berlin in verbindung mit dem Otto-Suhr-Institut an der freien Universität Berlin, p. 59.

[b]As listed in Statistisches Jahrbuch für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland (1970). Wiesbaden: Statistisches Bundesamt, p. 115.

Given the subordinate position of the Bundestag itself and the existence of strong party organizations with the power to deny nomination and, thus, election or re-election to prospective Members, the unenviable position of the individual Deputy is to be expected. Although the percentage of positive responses has risen steadily since the question was first asked in 1951, 28 per cent of survey respondents in 1964 still said that it did not take great ability to become a Bundestag Deputy and another 18 per cent were undecided (Institut für Demoskopie, 1967: Table 17). Similarly, several surveys have indicated that only a very small percentage of the electorate, between 12 and 17 per cent, is even aware of any activity on the part of the Representative elected by their district, a further indication of their lack of individual importance (see Raschke, 1965: 50; Noelle and Neumann, 1967: 230). Within the Bundestag "leadership has increasingly been exercised by a small group of professional parliamentarians possessing the relevant tactical skills" (Loewenberg, 1966: 433). These leaders make committee assignments, determine who will speak in favor or against a given bill in the very limited time granted to debate, and, in general, dominate the proceedings of Parliament. Loewenberg (1966: 387) found that in the Third Bundestag three-fifths of the Members spoke ten times or less during the four-year term and that fewer than one-fifth of the Members made over two-thirds of the speeches.

Despite its subordination to the executive branch, the Bundestag continues to play an important role in the political life of Germany. But it is not easy to specify the exact nature of that role (see Carter and Herz, 1967: 423-431). Plischke (1969: 67) has written that "in some respects it does not appear to enjoy the power and prestige indicative of certain other democratic systems, but neither is it comparable to the pseudo-representative agencies of the nominal or quasi-democracies." In addition to its role in policy formation, the Bundestag performs at least two other important functions. First of all, it is almost the sole source of ministerial recruitment today, in sharp contrast to earlier eras (see Knight, 1952). Secondly, it serves a system-legitimizing role through the performance of "electoral conversion functions" which "affects the level of public support for the regime, which in turn affects regime stability" (Loewenberg, 1971: 187; see also Raschke, 1968: 13-17).

The Bundestag's system-legitimizing role is intimately bound up with the induction of new members into the Federal Republic's primary legislative organ. As Schlesinger (1966: 2) perceptively observed: "A political system unable to kindle ambitions for office is as much in danger of breaking down as one unable to restrain ambitions." Given the existence of political ambition, system legitimacy and stability are increased by providing regular and predict-

able opportunities for advancement. The examination of the social and political bases of Bundestag recruitment in the following chapters should enhance our understanding of its multi-faceted role in contemporary German politics.

NOTES

1. The founding of the Federal Republic has been the subject of two excellent, complementary books. See Golay (1958) and Merkl (1963). The reader may also want to explore many of the original documents contained in Pollock and Meisel (1947).

2. It could be argued, of course, that a similar situation existed in the United States at the time of the Constitutional Convention, but the unifying experience of the Revolutionary War and the existence of an embryonic national framework in the Articles of Confederation make the two cases hardly comparable.

3. The history of the princely Estates has been thoroughly investigated by Carsten (1963), whose work is based largely on primary sources. A brief, general introduction to the history of parliaments in Germany since the tenth century is Ullmann and King-Hall (1954). The interested reader may want to look at Appendix B in the Ullmann and King-Hall volume which contains suggestions for further reading on the general topic. The author would also like to recommend the excellent study of the Frankfurt Parliament by Eyck (1968). This in-depth study of the short life of an extremely important phenomenon is a welcome addition to German scholarship. The following section is largely based on these works and the more general treatment of the subject in standard texts.

4. Much more attention has been devoted to the Weimar era than to most periods of German history. A useful introduction, with a strong political viewpoint, is Halperin (1946). For additional sources, see the bibliography in Pinson (1966: 613-614).

5. For a somewhat contrasting view of the importance of the states in the federal structure see Pinney's (1963) excellent study of the Bundesrat, the second chamber of the German legislative system, which is composed of representatives of the Laender governments.

6. In retrospect it seems particularly crucial that government was re-established on the local and Land level before a revived national government received serious consideration. The political elites of government and party which developed around these local centers had a vested interest in the maintenance of their positions and were able to influence the shape of German federalism. Another important outcome of the early establishment of the lower levels of government has been the attraction of many able politicians and civil servants to Land-level institutions. Heidenheimer (1966: 176) points out that this concentration of talent has been particularly important in the SPD which for most of the period under consideration was denied access to federal ministerial positions.

7. The electoral law is quite complex. For more extensive descriptions of its features and operation see Pollock (1955), Kitzinger (1958), Loewenberg (1966: 65), and Conradt (1970).

8. The fluctuation in total seats prior to 1957, however, is mainly due to changes in the electoral laws and the addition of the Saar to Germany in 1957. In 1953 it was decided to return to a fifty-fifty system, but to avoid eliminating any constituency seats, the total number of mandates was increased to 506 (including 22 nonvoting delegates from West Berlin). Three "superproportional" mandates brought the total to 509. In 1957 the addition of the Saar to the Federal Republic meant increasing the number of constituencies from 242 to 247, bringing the total number of regular seats up to 516 (494 plus 22 nonvoting delegates from Berlin. In 1965, on the basis of the 1961 census, the number of constituencies was increased from 247 to 248, bringing the new total up to 518. In that year there were no "superproportional" mandates.

9. The sixty-forty ratio was employed in the 1949 election, but the House returned to a fifty-fifty basis in 1953.

10. The provision is actually slightly more complex. In 1949 parties had to obtain at least 5 per cent of the valid vote or elect one deputy in an electoral district before they could benefit from the proportional distribution of seats. In 1953 the provision was made even more restrictive by requiring parties to win three constituency seats before being eligible for the proportional distribution of seats, unless, of course, they cleared the five per cent hurdle. Consequently, the number of parties in the Bundestag declined from 10 in 1949 to only 5 in 1953 and just 4 in 1957. Since 1961 only the CDU/CSU, the SPD, and the FDP have been represented in the Bundestag.

11. According to Edinger (1968: 267-268) this institutionalization of "legitimate" political parties has been justified by party leaders as necessary for a "smoothly functioning and stable democratic order," since it reconciles traditional German attitudes toward authority with the operation of a competetive party system.

12. Although we have placed some stress on the electoral provisions, Conradt and others have correctly pointed out that it would be misleading to focus on it as a causal factor in determining the structure of the party system, since the parties themselves have had a major role in shaping the electoral system. "The development of this issue would seem to indicate that constitutional engineering...will be of lesser importance for the long-run stability of the Bonn democracy than the capability of existing institutions to produce policy outcomes that inhibit electoral fractionalization and anti-system movements" (Conradt, 1970: 356).

13. This should not be taken to imply that the German situation is, in some sense, less"democratic" than elsewhere. The issue is an interesting and debateable one in all political systems, but is not of concern here.

14. A recent commentator on the role of the Bundestag wrote that the function of elections was merely to decide the relative strength of the parties in that body. "Die Wahler können ihren politischen Willen in den Wahlen nur insoweit ausdrucken, als die Parteien den Willen der Wahler artikulieren"(The voters can express their political will in the elections only insofar as the parties articulate the will of the voters--author's translation)(Raschke, 1968: 13). Raschke (1968: 17) goes on to write: "Die Wahler entscheiden in der Wahl, welche Kandidaten Abgeordnete werden. Wer entscheidet aber über die Aufstellung der Kandidaten? Die Antwort heisst: die Parteien" (The voters decide in the election which candidates become Deputies. Who decides, however, on the selection of candidates? The answer is: the parties--author's translation). The issue need not stop there, of course, for an infinite regression is possible. Deutsch and Edinger (1959: 89), for example, take the next stop by looking at the "parties behind the parties," the powerful nongovernmental interest associations.

15. Dahrendorf reports a study by E. Reigrotzki, Soziale Verpflechtung in der Bundesrepublik (Tubingen, 1956), which sought to fill the void between voting and gladiatorial activities by an intensive examination of subsidiary social activities. An index based on the frequency of political conversations, participation in election meetings and interest in political radio commentaries yielded three groups: "higher activity" (22 per cent), "medium activity" (28 per cent), and "low activity" (50 per cent). For more complete discussion and a critique see Dahrendorf (1967: 318).

16. In this regard, Raschke (1968: 13) has aptly written:

> Wahlsoziologische Untersuchungen zeigen, dass die Wahl des einzelnen Abgeordneten in den Hintergrund tritt gegenüber der Wahl der Partei (Richtungsbestimmung) und der Entscheidung über die Spitzenkandidaten. Das bedeutet, dass die soziale position des Kandidaten und seine fachliche Qualifikation als Abgeordneter für den Wahler untergeordnete Auswahlkriterien sind. Diese Tatsache erhölt die Verantwortung der der Parteien bei der Auswahl der Kandidaten.

CHAPTER 4

SOCIAL FACTORS IN RECRUITMENT

In a perceptive article, Snowiss (1966: 627) has argued that "the study of recruitment and the study of representation are complementary." Much of the recruitment literature has explicitly or implicitly concerned itself with this issue and the findings are usually the same: While there are important variations from one political system to another, investigation of the social backgrounds of legislative members almost inevitably reveals the "unrepresentative" character of these bodies with respect to the general populace. As one investigator wrote, "everywhere political advantage reflects social and economic advantages; officeholders are a very unrepresentative sample of the population at large" (Schlesinger, 1966: 11).[1]

Table 5 presents comparable social data for the 1,161 Deputies of this study and the German populace. It clearly shows that Deputies are older, better educated, have more prestigeous occupations, and are more likely to be male than the general population. Only in religious affiliation do they even roughly mirror society, and then only when the extremely large group of non-respondents is discounted.

TABLE 5

BASIC SOCIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF DEPUTIES AND POPULACE

Characteristic	Deputies		Populace
Sex[a]	N=1161		
male	93.2		45.8
female	6.8		54.2
Religion[b]	N=1161		
Catholic	35.6		44.1
Protestant	31.0		50.5
other	0.2		6.4
n. a.	33.2		
Age[a]	N=1161		
21-29	1.1		15.3
30-44	37.3		31.3
45-59	50.1		25.9
60+	11.2		27.5
Education[c]	N=1095		
primary	11.4		82.0
secondary	24.2		10.0
university	58.0		5.0
other	6.4		
Occupation[d]	N=1148		
public officials	11.3		5.5
professionals	20.6	self-employed and professionals	18.3
businessmen	12.1		
farmers	7.0		
white collar employees	2.5		28.8
workers	2.5		47.4
politicians	25.1		
interest group employees	16.9		
other	2.0		

[a]Populace figures are for the electorate, rather than total population, as presented in "Wahl zum 6. Deutschen Bundestag am 28 September 1969" (1971). Fachserie A, Bevoelkerung und Kultur, Reihe 8. Wiesbaden: Statistisches Bundesamt, pp. 12, 17.

TABLE 5 (continued)

[b]Figures for the populace are from Statistisches Jahrbuch für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland (1969). Wiesbaden: Statistisches Bundesamt, p. 38.

[c]Figures for populace are approximations derived from Edinger, L. (1968). Politics in Germany. Boston: Little, Brown, pp. 45-46.

[d]As cited in Statistisches Jahrbuch für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland (1970). Wiesbaden: Statistisches Bundesamt, p. 120.

It is not our purpose, however, to belabor the obvious. Rather, the goal is to demonstrate that certain social factors, notably sex, religion, education, occupation, and interest affiliation, are relevant to political recruitment not only because they predispose some persons to higher levels of political activity, but because they operate differentially to funnel an already much reduced population of "social eligibles" into the established parties where the complex interaction of the major recruitment party, interest group, and constituency determines candidate selection and ultimate election.[2] An analysis of the social backgrounds of Deputies clearly reveals the calculated attempts of both parties, particularly the CDU, to select candidates acceptable to the mass electorate and to respond to pressures from numerous subgroups within the party itself.

The first section of this chapter is devoted to an examination of inter-party variations in basic social background characteristics: age, sex, religion, education, and occupation. The thesis is that although legislators do not accurately mirror the electorate at large, inter-party differences are, in direction, generally consistent with the parties' contrasting social bases in the electorate. This is complemented by the construction of a typology of socio-political backgrounds based on occupation, interest affiliation, and levels of political activity. In the next section the impact of social backgrounds on

candidacy is traced in terms of the propensity to be elected in a district or on the party list and, within the latter category, the chances of securing a "safe" position. Finally, the social backgrounds of 193 Deputies initially elected in districts in the period 1961-1969 are briefly re-examined to shed light on the role of religion and occupational social requisites in the selection process.

Variations on a Theme: The Social Structure of the Parties

Age

The mean age of all freshmen Deputies is 47.92 years, which is several years younger than the average age for Members of any particular session because of the re-election of incumbents. Significantly, however, the initial entry age has been declining in almost every election since 1949. From a high of 50.7 years in 1949 it dropped to around 48.5 years from 1953 to 1961, and took a sharp decline in 1965 when it dropped to 44.4 years. In the latest election the average age of new Deputies was just 43.8, a further indication of the rapid replacement of the first generation of Abgeordneten (see Kaack, 1969: 29-39). Table 6 summarizes the age distribution of all new Members by party and gives comparative figures for their supporters in the last election. Although the differences are not overwhelming, it is clear

that the SPD receives a greater share of its support from younger voters, over half of whom are under age 45, and selects a considerably larger proportion of its Deputies from this age group.

TABLE 6

AGE DISTRIBUTION OF DEPUTIES AND VOTERS BY PARTY

	Deputies			Voters[a]	
Age	CDU N=614	SPD N=517	Age	CDU	SPD
21-29	0.8	1.5	21-30	14.3	16.6
30-44	33.3	42.5	30-45	29.1	33.6
45-59	53.1	46.7	45-60	26.1	24.9
60 and over	12.9	9.3	60 and over	30.5	24.8

[a]Data on voters for 1969 Bundestag elections from "Wahl zum 6. Deutschen Bundestag am 28. September 1969" (1971). Fachserie A, Bevoelkerung und Kultur, Reihe 8. Wiesbaden: Statistisches Bundesamt, p. 17.

Most persons come to the Bundestag during their peak productive years, roughly between the ages of forty and fifty-four. They have had the opportunity to gain success in the private sphere or at other levels in the political realm. The kinds of experiences which have molded these persons can be crudely measured through age-cohort groupings. Kaack (1969: 57-59), for example, identifies five political types partly on the basis of their age and generational experiences.[3] And Loewenberg (1966: 91-95) contrasts the experiences and present activities of an

older and younger group of Deputies in 1957. Most of the major party Deputies were adults before the republic which they serve was created. Only 195 (16.8 per cent) Members attained their majority after World War II, almost all of these entering in the last two sessions as the older generation has died or been shunted aside. Two hundred fifteen Members (18.5 per cent) reached age 21 under the old German Empire. An additional 466 Deputies (40.1 per cent) came of age during the Weimar era. Finally, 285 persons (24.5 per cent) grew to adulthood under the Third Reich. This latter group experienced the full fury of war and defeat, often as frontline soldiers and prisoners of war.

Generational differences reflect differential opportunity and lead to a consideration of the prior political experiences of the Deputies, particularly the older generation of Members first elected in 1949 and 1953. On the basis of their personal biographical sketches, 320 persons had definitely been politically involved prior to 1945, either holding public office or being an active party member. These figures, however, undoubtedly underestimate total prewar political activity, especially in the Nazi era, and point to one of the weaknesses of this kind of study. For example, of the 320 persons specifying prewar activities, 300 mentioned the Weimar period and just 29 reveal associations with the Third Reich.[4] Karl Loewenstein, however, determined that at

least 53 Members of the First Bundestag, or 13 per cent of the membership, had been members of the Nazi party (Loewenstein, 1952: 525). And the Association of Victims of the Nazi Regime found that 111 Members of the forth session, elected in 1961, had served the Nazi state as officials, diplomats, jurists or war economists (see Loewenberg, 1966: 92).[5] Making certain assumptions about the earliest age at which an individual might be politically active leads to the conclusion that an additional 770 persons could have been political participants in the years prior to 1945, while only 71 are logically excluded because of their tender years.[6] This merely sets the maximum parameters, however, and certainly overestimates prewar political experiences.

Taking as a dividing line the year 1907, thus separating the Members of the 1957 session into two groups (those under the age 50 and those over age 50), Loewenberg (1966: 91-95) discovered a number of interesting contrasts in prior experience. The younger group, of course, was largely excluded from possible participation in democratic politics until after the Second World War. But, surprisingly, it was the older group that was less familiar with democratic institutions. Older CDU members were particularly likely to have been politically inactive until after the war. And while a greater proportion of SPD Deputies had held public office in the Weimar period or been active in the

party, their participation rate was still lower than that for younger Members. "For the average Member over fifty years of age, elective political experience was crowded into the brief period between 1945 and his entrance into the Bundestag, which came most likely in 1949, or in 1953" (Loewenberg, 1966: 93-94). Two probable results of the acceleration of political careers and the concomitant lack of political expertise on the part of many Members in the first two sessions were the early domination of the body by a small group of parliamentarians, and the rapid rise of younger elements to positions of leadership (Loewenberg, 1966: 94).

The Role of Women

Compared to other legislative bodies in Europe and the United States, women are remarkably well represented in the Bundestag (see Table 7). This is particularly the case when one considers the generally lower level of political activity of women in Germany and the fact that they account for a smaller proportion of party membership than in Great Britain and the United States (see Almond and Verba, 1965: 183, 259; Loewenberg, 1966: 95-99; Bremme, 1956: 147-194).[7] Since 1949, 6.8 per cent of major party Deputies have been women (see Table 7) and they have secured from 6.9 per cent to 9.2 per cent of Bundestag seats.[8] They have held more leadership positions than their numbers would suggest, including several committee chairmanships and a Bundestag Vice-Presidency. Two women,

Elizabeth Schwarzhaupt (1961-1966) and Käte Strobel (since 1966) have been in the cabinet, each serving as Minister of Health.

TABLE 7

THE PERCENTAGE OF MEN AND WOMEN AMONG DEPUTIES, PARTY MEMBERS AND VOTERS

	CDU	SPD	Total
Deputies			
male N=1082	93.8	92.5	93.2
female N=79	6.2	7.5	6.8
Party members[a]			
male	86.0	82.7	
female	14.0	17.3	
Voters (1969)[b]			
male	40.6	48.9	45.8
female	59.4	51.1	54.2

[a]CDU figures are from Loewenberg, G. (1966) Parliament in the German Political System. Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell Univ. Press, P. 97. For the SPD see Jahrbuch der SPD 1966/67 (c. 1967). Bad Godesberg: Neuer Vorwärts Verlag, p. 157.

[b]Percentages calculated from absolute vote as listed in "Wahl zum 6. Deutsches Bundestag am 28. September 1969" (1971). Fachserie A, Bevölkerung und Kultur, Reihe 8. Wiesbaden: Statistisches Bundesamt, p. 50.

The relatively high proportion of women in the Bundestag is a result of the parties' attention to organized subgroup interests and, particularly within the SPD, to a deliberate effort to improve its weaker appeal to women

in the electorate.[9] This, along with the socialist party's traditionally greater concern for the civil rights of women, helps to explain why they fare better in that party.

The explicit attempt to elect women candidates is evident from the fact that they do much better on party lists than in single-member districts, both as candidates and as elected Deputies (see Table 8). Women are usually granted a secure list position and, in some years, have had a better chance of list election, relative to their share of list candidacies, than men (see Bremme, 1956: 144; Zeuner, 1970: 134; Loewenberg, 1966: 97).[10] In the 1965 election this held true only for the SPD, another indication of their position in the parties.

TABLE 8

THE PROPORTION OF WOMEN AS CANDIDATES AND DEPUTIES IN THE 1965 BUNDESTAG ELECTION[a]

	CDU	SPD	Total
Number of women elected	14	17	31
Percentage of candidacies:			
in Wahlkreis	3.62	6.04	4.84
on party list	15.75	9.84	12.57
total	7.97	7.03	7.55
Percentage of Deputies elected:			
in Wahlkreis	1.29	13.19	5.71
from party list	6.38	10.18	8.41
total	3.23	11.56	6.94

[a]Adapted from Zeuner, B. (1970). Kandidatenaufstellung zur Bundestagswahl 1965. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, p.134.

Overall, however, women are clearly underrepresented relative both to their share of the electorate and the strength of their membership in the parties. Not only do they get only a small share of all candidacies, but their chances of being elected are slimmer and, thus, they constitute an even smaller proportion of the total number of elected Deputies. Political participation at the level of the national legislature continues to be largely a perogative of men.

Religion

At an aggregate level it is difficult to interpret the religious variable because so many SPD Deputies chose not to reveal their religious affiliation (see Table 9). If we ignore, for the moment, those persons not listing any religious affiliation and the two Jewish Deputies, the composition of the Bundestag roughly mirrors that of society. Within this group, Catholics are somewhat over-represented (53 per cent) compared to their proportion of the total population (44.1 per cent). This may, however, be an artifact of the unwillingness of SPD Deputies to list their religion.

In contrast to the socialists, the CDU makes a strong point of the religious affiliation of candidates since it sees itself as an inter-denominational Christian party (see Politisches Jahrbuch der CDU und CSU, 1968, 1968: 89). Only 3 per cent of CDU Deputies failed to list their religion.

TABLE 9

THE RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION OF DEPUTIES AND PARTY SUPPORTERS

	Catholic	Protestant	Jewish	None Listed
Deputies				
CDU N=644	58.9	38.2	-	3.0
SPD N=517	7.5	22.8	0.4	69.2
Total N=1161	35.6	31.0	0.2	33.2
Party Supporters				
CDU	61.0	37.0		
SPD	32.0	61.0		

[a]As listed in Heidenheimer, A. (1966). The Governments of Germany (Second ed.). New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, p. 108.

The calculated nature of the party's effort to achieve religious parity is revealed in the fact that the ratio of Catholics to Protestants among CDU Deputies is almost exactly the same as the ratio among their supporters. The SPD, for much of its history strongly anti-clerical, operates under no such restraint. A comparison of its Deputies and supporters reveals no policy of religious parity. Nevertheless, as will be shown in a later section of this chapter, the religious variable is the most tangible social link between the Deputy and his constituency.

Education

Education is an important filter in the process of political recruitment because it seriously restricts eligibility for elite positions. Educational levels in the Federal Republic are exceptionally low for an

advanced industrial country, sparking sharp political controversy in recent years (see Heidenheimer, 1966: 91; Bulletin, January 24, 1970: 105-111). Public universities stand at the apex of a highly elitist educational system that provides 82 per cent of the adult population with only eight years of education, another 10 per cent with a 10 year secondary education and only 5 per cent the esteemed Abitur, a degree granted by the Gymnasium (a combination high school-junior college), that is a prerequisite to entering the university (Edinger, 1968: 45-46). An Abitur is a vital necessity for success in the business world, while a university degree is a prerequisite to entry into the professions and civil service. Table 10 shows that education is equally important for political success.

TABLE 10

THE EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT LEVEL OF BUNDESTAG DEPUTIES

	N	Primary	Secondary	Technical-Vocational	University or equivalent	Other
CDU	616	7.6	10.4	10.6	66.9	4.5
SPD	479	16.3	14.8	13.6	46.6	8.8
Total	1095	11.4	12.3	11.9	58.0	6.4

Unfortunately, the data does not allow us to distinguish between those persons who received the Abitur and those who

simply attended the shorter, less prestigeous Mittelschule. At the very least, however, 58 per cent of Bundestag Deputies come from the upper 5 per cent of the populace in terms of education. There are, of course, important variations between the two parties in educational attainment level. These differences are entirely consistent with the idea of the socialist party as the party of the worker and the lower classes. More than twice as many SPD Deputies had only a primary education, almost all of these persons being trained as skilled tradesmen and entering politics through union activities. Even in the SPD, however, nearly half the Members have an advanced education. In general, Loewenberg (1966: 103) has found that educational attainment is strongly correlated with participation in debate and advancement to leadership position within the Bundestag and government. Ninety-four per cent of the 1957 cabinet, the pinnacle of political success, had a university education (Loewenberg, 1966: 103).

Education is relevant to recruitment not only as an idicator of achieved status (see Legg, 1969b: 536), but because it equips the individual with skills suitable for the political arena. In this regard, the study of law is clearly the foundation of German politics. Dahrendorf (1969: 223) concludes that roughly two-fifths of Germany's political elite is trained in law. As shown in Table 11, legal training is not quite that common in the Bundestag, but almost one-fourth of the Members still have a legal

background. Among the university-educated, 38.1 per cent have legal training. Legal studies do not imply the practice of law since the course of study is regarded as suitable preparation for a wide range of elite positions. Most higher civil servants in the Bundestag and many of the professional politicians, interest group employees and businessmen have legal backgrounds. Thus, although 24.9 per cent of all major party Deputies have studied law at some time in their career, only 8.1 per cent indicate that they were practicing law, whether as members of the judiciary, public prosecutors, or in private practice, at the time of their initial election, and the actual figure may be as low as 5.5 per cent.

TABLE 11

EDUCATIONAL OR OCCUPATIONAL TRAINING FIELDS OF DEPUTIES BY PARTY

	CDU N=564	SPD N=421	Total N=985
Administration	5.1	7.8	6.3
Agriculture	13.7	1.4	8.4
Humanities and Social Sciences	24.3	28.3	26.0
Law	30.1	16.4	24.3
Military	0.2	--	0.1
Science and Engineering	5.3	3.3	4.5
Skilled trade	11.5	24.9	17.3
Teaching	4.3	6.7	5.3
Other	5.5	11.2	7.9

The Members of the two parties differ significantly in their educational experiences. Almost twice as many CDU Deputies have studied law, while twice as many SPD members have been drawn from the skilled trades. With the additional exception of agriculture, which is almost totally confined to the Christian Democrats, the other categories are about equally represented in both parties. The conglomerate category of the humanities and social sciences, largely limited to the university-educated, defies analysis, but since the inter-party variations are minimal this is not a matter of great concern. With the exception of legal studies and skilled trades, educational training fields are closely related to the actual occupations of Deputies. The findings here are, therefore, quite consistent with the social bases of the parties.

One's area of expertise, like the possession of an advanced education itself, has important implications for participation in the political activities of the Bundestag. Among Members of the Third Bundestag, those trained in law and as teachers were over represented in parliamentary leadership positions and in the government itself, while all other groups were under represented. Skilled tradesmen were, not surprisingly, the most poorly represented among leadership groups (Loewenberg, 1966: 105). Participation in debate, while connected to having a position of leadership, is another area in which those trained in law stand out. Nearly half (45.2 per cent) of the "generalists,"

those who spoke frequently on a wide variety of subjects were trained in law (Loewenberg, 1966: 105). Finally, Loewenberg (1966: 106) found that lawyers were concentrated in the busiest and most important committees, particularly Foreign Affairs, Interior Affairs, and Finance.

Occupation

Occupation is an exceedingly difficult variable to operationalize and its social significance has been seriously questioned (see Meynaud, 1961).[11] Classificatory problems are compounded by major problems of data reliability since there is a definite tendency to use misleading or meaningless occupational designations, such as Angestellte (employee), Diplom-Volkswirt (an educational, not occupational term), and Rechtsanwalt (lawyer) in order to downplay interest group ties or to appeal to a particular sector of the electorate. A union leader, therefore, may call himself an employee, as may a leading company executive. Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Minister of Interior Affairs and national Vice-Chairman of the Free Democratic Party, listed his occupation at the last election as lawyer despite the fact that he has been a full-time employee of the FDP since 1956. Recognizing these difficulties, Table 12 presents one arrangement of occupations by party affiliation which is helpful in clarifying the social bases of the parties and, more importantly, in making a preliminary assessment of the degree to which political opportunities in Germany are structured through a variety of organizations.

TABLE 12

ASSESSED OCCUPATION OF DEPUTIES BY PARTY[a]

	CDU N=635	SPD N=513	Total N=1148
Public employees	11.8	10.7	11.3
Free professions			
law	7.4	3.1	5.5
other	12.9	17.8	15.1
Business	17.8	5.1	12.1
Farmers	12.3	2.7	7.0
White collar employees	1.1	4.3	2.5
Workers	1.3	4.1	2.5
Politicians	17.3	34.7	25.1
Interest group employees			
business	3.5	0.2	2.0
farm	1.7	---	1.0
labor	5.8	16.2	10.5
other	5.1	1.5	3.4
Other	2.0	1.9	2.0

[a]A complete breakdown of both officially listed occupations and occupation as assessed by this investigator in the 52 coding categories originally employed can be found in the Appendix. The major difference between listed and assessed occupations is the greater number of interest group employees and politicians in the latter and the consequent decline in the number of workers, public employees, and professionals.

The distribution of occupations between the parties is largely consistent with the composition of the parties' membership and their social bases in the electorate. Survey research shows that workers, particularly union members, tend to support the socialist party while most other occupational groups are equally divided between the two parties (white collar employees, civil service officials) or strongly supportive of the CDU. Professional people,

self-employed persons, and farmers favor the Christian Democrats by large margins (see Heidenheimer, 1966: 108).[12] Approximately one-half of the socialist party members are workers, while the same group accounts for only 15 per cent of CDU membership (see Apel, 1969: 126; Jahrbuch der SPD 1966/67; c. 1967: 158).[13] Relatively speaking, then, labor is no more under represented in the CDU than in the SPD.[14] The total number of workers who enter Parliament, however, is much less than would be expected from educational data because many of these persons are classified as politicians or interest group employees. Civil servants make up about the same proportion of each party's membership (18.0 per cent for the CDU and about 12 per cent for the SPD) and are equally represented in the Bundestag delegations. As one would expect, self-employed persons, a category that would include most businessmen and farmers, gravitate toward the CDU, accounting for 33.5 per cent of its total membership and a similar share of its parliamentary Deputies. Similarly, the inter-party distribution of interest group employees is entirely predictable. Although both parties have similar proportions of interest employees, almost all of those in the SPD represent labor groups, usually the DGB (Deutsche Gewerkschaftsbund), while in the CDU they are more evenly distributed between labor, business and such other groups as refugees and expellees, indicative of the broader social base of that party.

In general, if occupations are ranked in terms of prestige ratings, a most difficult task, the CDU clearly emerges as the higher status party, reflective of its middle-class orientation.[15] At least 61.1 per cent of major party Deputies could be considered upper-middle-class, while an additional 36.4 per cent would be middle or lower-middle-class. Only 2.5 per cent could be called working, or lower-class.[16] Almost three-fourths (71.1 per cent) of CDU Members fall into the highest group, while less than one-half (48.7 per cent) of SPD Deputies do so.

A Socio-political Background Typology

The occupational scheme employed up to this point, while helpful, leaves much to be desired. For one thing, an emphasis on occupation ignores the interest affiliations of Deputies that are not employed by such groups. Thus, a labor union member is not classified as a union employee, but he may still "represent" union interests.[17] Secondly, the scheme fails to deal with the political activities of nonprofessional politicians. Since Fishel (1970: 4-4a), in a recent study of party professionalism and candidate selection in Germany, found that even most political amateurs spent at least 5 to 10 hours per week on party affairs, this should be a matter of some concern. A better understanding of political professionalism and interest affiliation can be gained by combining data about an individual's occupation, his affiliation with certain interest groups, without regard to his actual employment,

and his level of political activity. Utilizing these three dimensions, the importance of which is clearly revealed by their prominent location in a number of classificatory schemes, it is possible to identify eight distinct types of Members of Parliament.[18] These types and the strength of their representation in the Bundestag are listed in Table 13.

Of the 1,148 Deputies that could be classified, 666 (58 per cent) indicated that they held a basically non-political occupation at the time of initial election, 545 (47.5 per cent) were highly active politically, holding at least two public or two party offices, and 521 (45.3 per cent) were affiliated with some organized interest group. Of the latter Deputies, 74 were affiliated with business and industry, 30 with the old middle-class, the Mittelstand, 83 with agriculture, 221 with labor, 31 with the churches, 11 with veterans groups, 45 with refugee organizations, and 26 with other, less politically relevant groups, such as the YMCA and Red Cross.

Despite the preponderant role of professional politicians within the House itself, a large number of Deputies (39.2 per cent) appear to have been political amateurs at their initial election. The proportion of amateurs is significantly higher in the CDU (44.5 per cent) than in the SPD 32.5 per cent), while there are almost twice as many professional politicians in the SPD (34.7 per cent as

TABLE 13

SOCIO-POLITICAL BACKGROUND TYPOLOGY BASED ON ASSESSED OCCUPATION, INTEREST AFFILIATION AND LEVEL OF POLITICAL ACTIVITY BY PARTY[a]

	CDU N=635	SPD N=513	Total N=1148
Professional politician:			
with interest affiliation	4.7	5.1	4.9
without interest affiliation	12.6	29.6	20.2
Semi-professional politician:			
with interest affiliation	9.1	3.9	6.8
without interest affiliation	12.9	10.9	12.0
Amateur politician:			
with interest affiliation	21.4	11.1	16.8
without interest affiliation	23.1	21.4	22.4
Interest group employee:			
with high political activity	3.5	3.7	3.6
with low political activity	12.6	14.2	13.3

[a]Classificatory criteria are as follows: Assessed occupation was trichotomized into political, nonpolitical, and interest group categories. Public employees are part of the nonpolitical sector, although this is subject to criticism. Interest affiliation (defined as membership in a specific organization, not a class or occupational grouping) was determined for all persons in each occupational group. Political activity was dichotomized into high and low categories, the criteria being whether or not one held two or more public or party offices at initial election. Holding one public and one party office was not sufficient for the higher classification. The distinction between semi-professional and amateur politicians, both having nonpolitical occupations, is based on the higher level of political activity of the former. Not all persons who held elective offices are listed as professional politicians. An assessed occupation as a professional politician means that the individual's principal occupation was a paid public or party position.

compared to 17.3 per cent of CDU Deputies). These findings are consistent with the general view of the SPD as a more highly organized, more throughly professionalized party.

Another major difference between the parties is in the number of Members with some kind of explicit tie to an interest group. The broader social base of the CDU has meant that it is more subject to subgroup pressures as it goes about the difficult task of balancing interests (see Domes, 1964: 33-40). An excellent example is in the way the two parties distributed list nominations in North Rhine Westphalia at the last Bundestag election in 1969 (see Der Spiegel, July 9, 1969: 43). Both parties reserved the first few relatively secure, positions for major party leaders such as Gerhard Schroeder (CDU), Rainer Barzel (CDU), Willy Brandt (SPD) and Karl Schiller (SPD). In the SPD, however, the remaining 39 positions were simply allocated to the four Landesbezirke without regard to their distribution between various interest groups. Not so, however, in the CDU which, after allocating all even-numbered positions to the Landesverband Westfalen-Lippe and the odd-numbered slots to the Landesverband Rheinland, proceeded to divide the 45 positions between a number of recognizable interests, most with formal organizations within the structure of the party (see Table 14). Over one-half of all CDU Deputies (51.3 per cent) are members or officers of interest associations, while only 38.0 per cent of SPD Deputies have similar affiliations.[19]

TABLE 14

DISTRIBUTION OF PARTY LIST POSITIONS FOR THE CDU IN NORTH RHINE-WESTPHALIA (1969)[a]

Group	Number of Positions
Business	8
Mittelstand[b]	6
Labor[b]	10
Civil Servants (including military)	3
Women[b]	6
Protestants[b]	3
Catholics	1
Agriculture	3
Youth[b]	4
Refugees	1

[a]As reported in Der Spiegel, July 9, 1969: 43.

[b]These demographic groups are represented in the CDU by formal auxiliary organizations called Vereinigungen. The auxiliary organizations are: Bundesvereinigung der Frauen der CDU, Mittelstandskreis der CDU und CSU, Sozialausschuesse der Christlich-Demokratischen Arbeitnehmerschaft, Junge Union Deutschlands, and Evangelischer Arbeitskreis der CDU und CSU. The last-mentioned group is not as closely related to the party, in a structural sense, as the others which participate directly in the selection of local party executive committees (see Jahrbuch der CDU und CSU, 1968, 1968: 110-111).

interestingly enough, the contrast in interest affiliations is particularly sharp among amateur politicians, indicative both of the greater role of organizational ties in the CDU and the negative relationship between political professionalism, as measured by the level of activity, and interest affiliation.[20]

In general, as the level of political activity increases, interest affiliation declines. Only 32.3 per cent of the

545 Deputies high in political activity had interest group ties, while 68.0 per cent of the 603 Deputies low in political activity were affiliated with such organizations. Thus, party and interest group emerge as clearly identifiable structures of political recruitment which, together, monopolize leadership selection. That they are distinct is confirmed by the fact that only 11.7 per cent of all Deputies are high in political activity and affiliated with organized interests. That they monopolize recruitment is evident from the fact that just 22.4 per cent of all Deputies have neither interest group ties, nor high levels of political activity. And this latter figure is further reduced when we consider that a mere 15.8 per cent of the Deputies indicated no political activity at all.

The relative importance of political activities in the process of recruitment is properly the subject for later chapters. It should be pointed out, however, that Fishel (1970: 3) has found that large majorities of Bundestag candidates themselves "perceive party as the dominant source of induction for candidacy." In addition, a number of other observers have called attention to the limited and declining role of narrow interest representation in the life of the House (see Loewenberg, 1966: 121-128; Raschke, 1968: 31; Apel, 1969: 86-87; Kaack, 1969: 60-67). The liberals' hope for a Parliament of "Notables," a Honoratoren-Parlament, has not been realized. Instead,

a Parliament of politicians, or at least one dominated by politicians, a Berufspolitiker-Parlament, has become a reality (Apel, 1969: 83; Loewenberg, 1966: 126).

Social factors enter the recruitment process at the level of the parties by channelling individuals from a variety of social backgrounds into these political structures at differential rates. Some social criteria are more important than others in distinguishing between the parties. The age and sex distributions, for example, are quite similar, while religion, education, occupation, and interest affiliation show marked party variation. But the role of these variables is not limited to the differential recruitment of persons into the parties. Within each party social factors continue to structure opportunities by helping to define the electoral status of Deputies.

Social Factors and Electoral Status

List versus District Seats

A system of proportional representation lends itself to manipulation by party elites and it is to be expected that social criteria would enter into their calculations. Four social factors--age, religion, sex, and interest affiliation--are related to the electoral status of Bundestag Deputies defined in terms of the type of seat (district or party list) from which a Member is elected. The relationships are not exceedingly strong, except for

the sex variable, but they are consistent with the widely held view that party lists are tools utilized by political parties in their quest for electoral success (Loewenberg, 1966: 78-81; Zeuner, 1970: 218-226; Eschenburg, 1956: 528-530). In general, list candidates are younger, more likely to be Protestant, more likely to be female (although still overwhelmingly male), and more likely to have an interest affiliation than persons initially elected in a district (see Table 15).

Age differences are minimal, although consistent for both parties, and not readily explicable in social terms. The differences are probably due, at least in part, to the amount of prior political experience in a Deputy's background since district candidates are often required to have a long history of local activity. The religious variable, at an aggregate level, is almost certainly a function of the greater number of district mandates obtained by the largest party, the predominantly Catholic CDU. Within each party, however, the minority religion gets disproportionate list representation. In the SPD 83.7 per cent of Catholic Deputies were elected on the list, while only 63.0 per cent of Protestants and an ever lower 54.0 per cent of those mentioning no religious affiliation were so elected. In the CDU, on the other hand, 51.2 per cent of the Protestant Deputies were elected on the list compared to just 40.7 per cent of the Catholics. The

TABLE 15

SOCIAL FACTORS AND THE ELECTORAL STATUS OF DEPUTIES[a]

	N	Elected in a District	Elected on Party List
Mean age (in years)		48.20	47.40
CDU	626	49.10	48.80
SPD	482	46.60	46.10
Sex			
Male	1036	51.73	48.27
Female	72	18.06	81.94
Religion			
Catholic	405	55.30	44.70
Protestant	351	45.01	54.99
None mentioned	351	47.29	52.71
Interest Affiliation			
Interest	501	41.31	58.69
No interest	607	56.34	43.66

[a]Table is based on 1108 persons elected in single-member districts (N=549) and on party lists (N=559). Excluded from calculations are 53 persons selected by the Berlin Abgeordnetenhaus, transferring from another party, and selected in accordance with the special Saar Law of 1956.

[b]Excluding one Jewish Member elected in a district.

electoral logic of guaranteeing minority group representation in the Bundestag through list nominations is clearly evident in this example.

We have already seen that women are elected almost exclusively on party lists and how the CDU has used the list to distribute seats to important subgroups within the party. Setting aside the tendency to place women on party lists, which has already been discussed at some length, the most important social determinant of a Deputy's electoral

status is the presence or absence of interest group ties. Interest group affiliates, being, on the whole, less active politically and, thus, less tied to a local constituency, are most likely to be elected on party lists where the full weight of their organizations at the Land and national level can be brought to bear on the process of candidate selection. The only exceptions to this rule were CDU Deputies active in farm organizations, 69.5 per cent of whom were elected in districts. This can probably be explained by their closer ties to the electoral constituency and the cohesiveness of agricultural associations (see Hirsch-Weber, 1958: 102). In terms of the background typology previously developed, it is interest association, rather than political professionalization, that stands out as a determinant of electoral status. If the eight types of Members are ranked by the percentage of Deputies elected in single-member districts (see Table 16), the five lowest categories all have interest group ties, while the three highest do not. With one exception, the high proportion (45.7 per cent) of SPD interest group representatives with low political activity elected in districts, the relationship holds within the parties.

Safe versus Unsafe List Position

Certain social factors are also related to the "safeness" of list seats. For our purposes, a "safe" list position is one in the upper two-thirds of successful candidacies, a criteria previously employed by Loewenberg

TABLE 16

THE PERCENTAGE OF DEPUTIES ELECTED IN A DISTRICT BY BACKGROUND TYPE

Socio-political Background Type	Percentage of Type
Interest group employee with high political activity	30.0
Professional politician with interest affiliation	35.3
Amateur politician with interest affiliation	40.9
Interest group employee with low political activity	44.2
Semi-professional politician with interest affiliation	45.2
Amateur politician without interest affiliation	54.3
Semi-professional politician without interest affiliation	56.8
Professional politician without interest affiliation	58.7

(1966: 82).[21] As might be expected, successful candidates elected from "unsafe" list positions are somewhat younger (mean age: 47.1 years) than persons elected from safe seats (mean age: 48.2 years), but this is almost solely a function of the much younger age of SPD Deputies elected from unsafe positions (mean age: 45.6 years) since there is almost no variance in the ages of CDU Members. Higher education and legal training, factors which correlate highly with House leadership (see Loewenberg. 1966: 103-105), also give one a modest advantage in seat safeness. These variables are not readily interpretable, however, and may simply be an artifact of the tendency to give secure list positions to

leading figures in party and government. The religious variable is of interest because it shows once again the continuing efforts of parties to aggregate subgoup interests by manipulating the electoral system. Within both parties the minority religion gets a slightly larger share (39.3 per cent) of safe positions than the dominant faith (31.8 per cent).[22] Finally, for CDU Members specific group affiliations seem clearly related to seat safeness. Representatives from the most important groups within the party--business, agricultral, labor and religious associations--are much more likely to get a safe seat (47.1 per cent) than Members from other groups (16.9 per cent). This was not the case, however, in the SPD where over three-fourths (79.5 per cent) of labor affiliates elected on the party list, the only important interest group in the party, had insecure positions.

Constituencies and Social Selection

Sorauf (1963: 81-89) has argued that there are two agencies of recruitment: the party and the constituency. He suggests that the value of social background studies lies in the fact that both party and constituency, as broad systems of political loyalties, try to select legislators who reflect those socially acquired values and loyalties. Parties stamp their mark by the kinds of candidates they select; constituencies define political

acceptablity and availability.

> The dominant values of the community result from its social characteristics, and these values are in turn imposed on all who would rise to positions of community leadership. The candidates for public office must reflect, at least in basic social affiliations, the constituency if they are to win its confidence and support (Sorauf, 1963: 89).

Thus, for Sorauf, legislators are products of the political socialization process of both party and constituency. Utilizing demographic data on the 248 Bundestag electoral districts it was possible to test for relationships between the social composition of districts, in terms of religion and urbanization, and the social backgrounds of the 193 Deputies elected in these areas in the period 1961 to 1969.[23]

The constituency variable most clearly related to the social background of Bundestag Members is religion. Of the 193 Deputies, 73 Catholics were elected in districts with populations averaging 62.9 per cent Catholic, while 56 Protestants were elected from districts with an average of only 31.6 per cent Catholics in the population. Significantly, the 64 persons who mentioned no religious affiliation were elected in districts slightly more Catholic (37.5 per cent) than were Protestant Deputies. These relationships are spelled out in even greater clarity in Table 17 where districts have been grouped into three categories on the basis of religious composition.[24]

TABLE 17

RELIGION AS A FACTOR IN THE ELECTION OF DEPUTIES

Deputy's Religion	Religious Composition of the District: Predominantly Protestant	Mixed	Predominantly Catholic
Protestant	30	19	7
Catholic	10	20	43
None mentioned	26	28	10

Chi Square = 49.27167 4d.f. significance level = .001
Gamma = 0.55163[a]

[a]Gamma is a non-parametric statistic developed by Leo A. Goodman and William H. Kruskal (1954) "Measures of association for cross-classification." Journal of the American Statistical Association 49: 732-764.

When the religious affiliation of Deputies and party supporters was discussed earlier in the chapter, it was difficult to assess the role of religion as a factor in political recruitment because of the large number of SPD Deputies who failed to list any such information. Although our conclusions on this point must of necessity be tentative, it would seem that the lack of religious affiliation, or at least the failure to mention it, is intimately bound up with the process of leadership selection. Note particularly that the majority of Deputies elected in Protestant districts are Protestant (54.5 per cent); the majority of Deputies elected in Catholic districts are Catholic (71.6 per cent); and at least a plurality of Deputies elected in ixed districts (41.8 per cent) failed to mention any religious

affiliation. The political lesson is simple: Deputies should belong to the dominant religious group in their district or failing that, particularly when there is no dominant group, they should simply avoid the subject altogether.

The relative urbanization of the district also places recognizable, but somewhat less important, restrictions on Deputy selection. Following Kornberg and Winsborough (1968: 1250-1252), who found that urbanization was positively related to the mean occupational status of candidates for the Canadian House of Commons, it was originally hypothesized that constituency urbanization would be positively related to the status of Bundestag Deputies as measured by the occupational status groupings discussed earlier in this chapter (see particularly notes 15 and 16). The cross tabulation of Deputy status (high, medium and low) with relative urbanization of the district (rural, industrial, and metropolitan), however, proved to be insignificant (chi square = 2.04164 with 4 d.f.; Gamma = 0.06255).[25] Computation of Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient was similarly unproductive (r = 0.1062; significance level = .102). There may be a number of reasons for failure to find a significant relationship. For one thing, we are dealing with Deputies rather than candidates and, generally speaking, successful candidates have higher social status than their unsuccessful opponents, which would tend to submerge any relationship between status and urbanization.

In addition, our measure of Deputy status is admittedly an imperfect one. But the almost total lack of relationship reinforces the conclusion that district urbanization does not create significant status requirements for potential Bundestag Members.

Urbanization, however, is significantly related to the occupational distribution of Deputies elected in districts (see Table 18). The relationship is more ambiguous than that between the Deputy's religion and the religious composition of the district, a fact reflected in the lower Gamma coefficient and less significant chi square correlation, and would seem to be largely an artifact of expected residential patterns. Thus, two-thirds of the persons with agricultural occupations, either farmers or farm interest group employees, were elected in rural districts, while 94.7 per cent of labor affiliates were elected from industrial and metropolitan districts. Somewhat unexpectedly, civil servants and white-collar employees are slightly over represented in rural areas, in the sense that 30.8 per cent of that occupational category are elected from rural districts which account for only 24.2 per cent of the constituencies in the sample. This may reflect their higher social standing in less populated areas, relative to the general populace, and would be in line with the thesis advanced by Prewitt and Eulau (1971) wherein Bay-area city councilmen were found to be elected from the upper two-fifths of all occupations within a particular community.

TABLE 18

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CONSTITUENCY URBANIZATION AND DEPUTY OCCUPATION[a]

	District		
	rural	industrial	metropolitan
Agriculture	8	4	0
Civil servant, white collar employee	12	17	10
Labor	1	8	10
Professions and business	15	38	26

Chi Square = 21.01733 with 6 d.f.
Significance level = .005
Gamma = 0.27741

[a]Persons with political occupations and interst group employees, other than those affiliated with agricultural, labor, or business groups, are excluded from this table in order to clarify basic relationships. Rather than 193 persons, therefore, the table is based on a total of just 149 cases.

Despite the fact that most agricultural affiliates are elected in rural areas, while laborers, professionals and businessmen are likely to be elected in more populous settings, district urbanization does not place severe restrictions on recruitment. In rural areas, for example, 41.7 per cent of the Deputies are from the professions and business, while another 33.3 per cent are civil servants and white-collar workers. Just 22.2 per cent of all rural Deputies had agricultural occupations. In all 3 types of constituencies, professionals and businessmen are the

largest single group, and they form a majority in all but rural areas. This would seem to indicate that only those occupations which are geographically circumscribed, such as agriculture and industrial labor, are limited to particular electoral settings. Since these groups account for only 20.9 per cent of the sample and are not, in any case, totally absent from other settings, it is reasonable to conclude that occupation per se is a minimal factor in the selection of constituency Deputies.

What then, can we say in conclusion about the role of social factors in the process of political recruitment? It is evident that people are differently recruited into the party structures, as Members and candidates for elective office, on the basis of their social backgrounds. Given the distribution of their social backing in the electorate and, particularly in the CDU, the existence of a number of relatively well organized subgroups within the party, the parties have been forced to give some attention to social criteria and group affiliation as they go about the business of selecting district candidates and balancing the party lists. But social restrictions are exceedingly broad and the parties have been largely successful in setting more specifically political requirements for high elective office, notably a considerable amount of party and public officeholding experience. The question to which we turn in the next two chapters is simply: "given the existence of certain broad social limitations on political

recruitment, how does the ambitious person go about structuring his political career in order to maximize his opportunities?"

NOTES

1. The Bundestag is no exception, although in social composition it perhaps more closely resembles the French Parliament than the U. S. Senate. Meynaud (1961) draws a contrast between Matthews' description of the U. S. Senate and other analyses of French, Italian and Israeli Parliaments in terms of their social status composition. Members of the French chamber, for example, are seen to have a somewhat lower average social status than U. S. Senators. The constrast seems equally valid for Germany.

2. For a more complete discussion of party and constituency as dual agents of recruitment see Sorauf (1963).

3. The five types, listed in the approximate order of their appearance in Bundestag politics, are idealists, pragmatists, technocrats, fanatics, an political technocrats.

4. Nine persons mentioned both Weimar and Third Reich activities, and are included in both totals.

5. The figures are not strictly comparable to the data of this study since they include the minor parties, mostly rightist, which undoubtedly had a larger proportion of former Nazis in their membership. Using the 1961 figures, however, and subtracting the 67 FDP Members, on the unlikely assumption that all were included in the 111 total cited by the Association of Victims of the Nazi Regime, still leaves at least 44 persons in the major parties with ties to the Third Reich.

6. The criteria employed were a minimum age of 21 for public officeholding and a minimum age of 17 for party activity. Some persons (N = 48) explicitly mentioned political activity at an earlier age, usually within auxiliary youth organizations sponsored by the parties, but any of these persons active in the pre-1945 period should already be included among the 320 specifically listing participation in that era.

7. Bremme (1956), while somewhat out of date, is the most complete discussion of the political role of women in Germany, covering their role in the parties and elective office on the local, Land, and national levels.

8. This is in sharp constrast to figures cited in Loewenberg (1966: 95-96) for Great Britain, France, Italy and the United States. Women held between 3.7 per cent (1945) and 4.4 per cent (1964) of the seats in the House of Commons; 6.1 per cent (1945) and 1.3 per cent (1958) of the seats in the French Parliament; between 7.0 per cent (1948) and 3.7 per cent (1958) of seats in the Italian house; and between 2.3 per cent (1953) and 2.2 per cent (1965) of the seats in the U. S. House and Senate combined.

9. Loewenberg (1966: 97) found that the CDU included a woman among the top five candidates in 8 of 10 Land lists in 1957, 9 of 10 in 1961. Comparable figures for the SPD are 7 of 10 in 1957 and 6 of 10 in 1961.

10. Comparable rates of election for men and women in 1953 (see Bremme, 1956: 144) and 1965 (see Zeuner, 1970: 134) show that women had a better chance in 1953, but less opportunity for election than men in 1965. This, of course, conceals the inter-party variations. Despite the fact that the socialists actually nominated fewer women, they succeeded in electing more of them in constituencies and on the party list. The only possible interpretation for this situation is that the SPD nominates women in more secure constituencies and in safer list positions. It should also be pointed out that an individual's absolute position on the list is not always a reliable guide to his election. Because the SPD elects fewer candidates in direct constituencies, it has tended to benefit more from the proportional distribution of seats. Thus, the first five list seats would normally be more secure for the SPD than for the CDU. In 1969 Kaack (1969: 23) estimated that 33 SPD list positions were safe, as opposed to only 25 for the CDU.

11. Compare, for example, the classification schemes employed by Deutsch and Edinger (1959: 68), Dahrendorf (1969: 238), Kirchheimer (1950: 597) and Brauenthal (1965: 154).

12. The interpretation of survey data cited in Heidenheimer is difficult since from 12 per cent to 22 per cent of respondents listed no preference. Fourty-six per cent of self-employed and professional people preferred the CDU, compared to 18 per cent for the SPD. Farmers gave overwhelming support to the CDU (66 per cent).

13. There is some discrepancy between the figures for the SPD cited by Apel and the SPD publication. Since the latter are more recent, one would tend to rely on them. The major difference between the two tables is a sharp decline in the percentage of party members classified as workers, the proportion dropping from 55.5 per cent to 44.5 per cent in 1967.

14. The CDU has always had a labor wing centered around its auxiliary organization, the Sozialausschusse der Christlich-Demokratishen Arbeitnehmarschaft (see Domes, 1964: 34,35). In 1968, 14 of the top 45 officers of this organization were Bundestag Deputies (see Politisches Jahrbuch der CDU und CSU, 1968, 1968: 325-327).

15. The occupational classification is extremely tentative. In so far as possible, it is based on the rankings of representative occupations employed by Alex Inkeles and Peter Rossi (1956), "National Comparisons of Occupational Prestige," American Journal of Sociology, 61: 329-339. Their study in turn was based on a 1954 survey of 38 occupations conducted by Professor Karl Martin Bolte and reported in Der Spiegel, June 30, 1954. The occupations were divided into five approximately equal groups and used as a guideline for classifying Bundestag occupations into one of five groups. The greatest difficulty was in assigning interest group representatives to a category and it was eventually decided to place them in the middle fifth of all occupations. The rationale here is debatable, however, since labor union representatives and representatives from business are included in the same category. The result of any change, however, would be simply to further exaggerate inter-party differences and would not affect the general findings. The following table summarizes these differences for 3 groups of Deputies:

	Low N=438	Medium N=332	High N=355
CDU	41.1	66.3	62.5
SPD	58.1	33.7	37.5

It should be stressed that the designations high, medium and low refer solely to groupings within the Bundestag itself. In the universe of all occupations, ranging from street peddlers to professors, 97.4 per cent of all Deputies fall into the upper three-fifths and 61 per cent into the upper two-fifths.

16. Upper-middle class is defined as having an occupation with a prestige ranking in the upper two-fifths of all occupations. The middle class is identified with the middle fifth, while the bottom two-fifths are considered to be lower class. Included here are skilled and unskilled workers.

17. Brauenthal (1965: 160-161) points out the pitfalls of a too narrow definition of interest representation in his study of business interests in the Bundestag.

18. The classification of Members of Parliament into discrete groups is hardly a new idea. Max Weber (1958) drew a distinction between those who live "for" and those who live "off" politics which has been widely echoed through the years. More recently, Wildenmann (1954: 144-145) has distinguished between political functionaries, experts, and backbenchers and Sternberger (1955: 62-63) has classified Members as professional politicians, interest group functionaries, and political amateurs. Finally, Loewenberg (1966: 121-128) has grouped Members into four categories: interest representative, professional politicians, public employees and those practicing a part-time private occupation.

19. The definition of interest group used here does not include the CDU Vereinigungen, which were coded as a separate variable. The major difference between the interests identified in Der Spiegel (see Table 10) and this study would be the absence of specific categories for youth and women in the latter. Presumably, members of the CDU labor wing, or its middle-class auxiliary, would have affiliations with non-party groups.

20. The crosstabulation of interest affiliation with the composite background variable shows that just 23.9 per cent of persons with labor affiliations are classified as amateurs practicing a private occupation. Over one-half (54.1 per cent) are considered to be interest group employees. For all other interest group categories, obviously more closely related to the CDU organization, between 37.5 per cent and 60.0 per cent are political amateurs practicing a private occupation, while only 13.3 per cent to 45.5 per cent are interest group employees. The key occupational difference, then is the much greater propensity for labor affiliates to be employees of their interest organization, an understandable relationship considering the financial inability of most lower-and lower-middle class persons to leave their jobs, for example in a factory, to serve in Parliament.

21. Although two-thirds of all list seats are "safe by definition," safe positions go largely to incumbent Members. Only one-third (35.1 per cent) of Deputies initially elected on the list had safe positions. It should also be kept in mind that the definition employed does not refer to their absolute location on the party list, but only to their relative location among those elected from the list. Both parties tend to give alternative list nominations to constituency candidates. Those elected in a district are removed from the list and everyone moved up appropriately (see Zeuner, 1970: 149-157).

22. Percentages based on 357 Members elected from party lists who indicated a religious affiliation and for whom district safeness could be determined. Excluded were 202 persons who did not list a religion and/or for whom district safeness was not indicated.

23. Information on 61 demographic variables, social and political, has been collected by Dr. David Conradt, University of Florida. Dr. Conradt has been kind enough to allow its use in this study.

24. The criteria for classification were as follows: 60 per cent Catholic and over-predominantly Catholic; 40 per cent to 60 per cent Catholic-mixed; less than 40 per cent Catholic-predominantly Protestant. See particularly Conradt (1971) for the suggestive use of this classification in the analysis of aggregate voting data.

25. Classification criteria for the districts were developed by Dr. Conradt on the basis of the occupational composition of the work force. Metropolitan districts were those in which the percentage of civil servants and salaried nonmanual employees exceeded 30 per cent. Industrial districts were those in which manual workers accounted for more than 48 per cent of the work force. Rural districts were those in which the combined percentage of independent nonmanuals and farmers exceeded 25 per cent. These criteria produced no overlapping constituencies. We have not stressed the occupational aspect in our discussion, preferring to emphasize instead the sharp population differences between the categories. The mean number of inhabitants per square mile are: rural=117.9; industrial=629.5; metropolitan=2,357.

CHAPTER 5

THE STRUCTURE OF POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY

Formal legal requirements for public officeholding set the outer boundary of recruitment, and social criteria further restrict the eligible population, but the final, crucial filter in the process of Deputy selection is the officeholding requirements imposed by the parties. The importance of political experiences has already been suggested in the last chapter, but the purpose here is to conduct a more detailed examination of the size and shape of the structure of political opportunities since, as Schlesinger (1966: 12) has written, "in the game of politics the political as well as the social system determines the players."[1] Although no attempt will be made to show that individuals actually perceive their opportunities exactly as presented here, it is clear that any case for the utility of political ambition as a conceptual tool must rest upon some perception of a structure of advancement--some notion of how the ambitious individual can get from A to B to C. The fact that opportunities are structured, that there are a limited number of recognizable career paths, lends support to the ambition concept and substantiates our research orientation.

The Size of the Opportunity Structure

One aspect of the structure of opportunities is its size, the number and kinds of chances for getting ahead in the political world. The total number of political opportunities in Germany is quite large. Hartenstein and Liepelt (1965: sec. 2.125, p. 32), for example, estimated that there are 220,000 members of local and county councils. In addition, in 1969 there were 1,352 Land legislative positions, 102 Land cabinet posts, 518 Bundestag mandates, and 15 federal ministries, including the Chancellorship. The tendency for persons to hold more than one of these offices at a time, however, reduces the number of realistic advancement possibilities by an as yet undetermined factor. A detailed study of the impact of multiple officeholding has not been conducted and is certainly beyond the scope of this work, but previous research on Lower Saxony did indicate that Landtag members there held a significant proportion of the most important lower public offices, particularly Landrat positions, and seriously restricted the political chances of others (see Watson, 1969: 60-62).

For present purposes, the most relevant political opportunity is the chance to be elected to the Bundestag. The average Deputy has served 2.281 terms, or about 9 years. This figure, however, includes over 300 persons who have entered in the last two sessions and therefore certainly underestimates political longevity. For example, 32 of the 301 individuals who entered the Bundestag during the first

TABLE 19

BUNDESTAG OPPORTUNITY RATES

	A Average no. of seats per session	B Total no. of seats (1949-69)	C Total no. of persons elected (1949-69)	Opportunity rate (½C/A)[a]
Bundestag (all)	499.2	2,995	1,383[b]	1.384
Baden-Württemberg	65.5	393	178	1.346
Bavaria	84.5	507	228	1.353
Bremen	5.3	32	16	1.509
Hamburg	17.0	102	43	1.266
Hesse	43.7	262	122	1.397
Lower Saxony	61.7	370	186	1.505
North Rhine-Westphalia	143.3	860	394	1.374
Rhineland-Palatinate	30.0	180	85	1.416
Saar[c]	8.3	33	19	1.718
Schleswig-Holstein	23.0	138	66	1.434
West Berlin	19.7	118	49	1.242

[a]A 12-year period covers 3 elections, or one-half the number that have taken place since 1949. The average number of persons elected in a 12-year period is therefore one-half the total number of persons who have served in the House. When divided by the average number of seats per session the result is a normalized opportunity rate (½C/A). Alternatively the same result can be obtained by dividing the total number of seats (B) by the total number of persons elected (C) and multiplying by three, the number of elections in a 12-year period.

[b]Bundestag total is slightly less than total for individual states (N=1,386) because three Deputies were elected in different Laender at subsequent elections. They were included in each Land total, but counted only once in computing the overall number of persons who have served in the House.

[c]Figures based on 1957-1969 elections only, excluding eleven persons entering the Bundestag in early 1957 (second session) under provisions of a special electoral law for the Saar of December, 1956.

session (1949-1953) continue to serve in the House. Schlesinger (1966: 39-43) has suggested that a useful measure of opportunity would be the number of times an office becomes available to a new person within a 12-year "political generation." Table 19 summarizes these opportunity rate calculations for the entire House, including minor party Members, and for each Land delegation. Since 1949 there have been 2,995 separate elections (district and list), but just 1,383 persons elected to fill these positions. This means that in a 12-year political generation the average seat is held by an average of 1,383 persons instead of the constitutional maximum (given the four-year term of office) of 3.000.

One point that emerges quite clearly from an examination of opportunity rates is that there appears to be a national structure of opportunity that transcends the Laender. Land variation in opportunity rates is insignificant, particularly in comparison to state variation for the U.S. House of Representatives. Opportunity rates for the U.S. House range from a low of 0.90 (Texas) to a high of 4.44 (Delaware) in spite of the fact that the overall rate (1.404) is almost identical to that of the Bundestag (see Schlesinger, 1966: 40-44). In terms of the number, kind and sequence

of political experiences in the background of Deputies, inter-state variations are usually insignificant and always apparently random. This is the case even when the Laender are ranked in the order of opportunity rates, a factor which might reasonably explain state differences (provided that rate differences were significant) since opportunity molds individual ambitions and perceptions of how to go about attaining career goals.

The Shape of the Opportunity Structure

Four Background Patterns

Given the existence of a substantial, but still limited number of chances to enter the Bundestag, what kind of persons, defined in terms of their career experiences, are most likely to reach that body? A preliminary assessment can be made by looking at the mixture of party and public offices in the backgrounds of individual Deputies. Of the 1161 Deputies studied 855 (73.6 per cent) had held public offices at some time prior to entering the Bundestag, 569 (49.0 per cent) had held party offices, and 184 (15.8 per cent) apparently had no officeholding experience. The statistically "average" Member has held 1.450 public offices and 0.826 party offices. Deputies can be grouped into the following four categories: (1) those who have held only public positions, (2) those who have held only party offices, (3) those who have held both party and public positions,

and (4) those who failed to mention any relevant public or party office experience in their biographical sketches. Table 20 lists the percentage distribution of Deptuties in these categories by party and also provides comparable data for the Lower Saxony Landtag.

TABLE 20

THE MIXTURE OF PUBLIC AND PARTY OFFICEHOLDING EXPERIENCES IN THE BACKGROUNDS OF DEPUTIES

	N	Pure public office-holders	Pure party office-holders	Mixed office-holders	No office experience
Bundestag					
CDU	644	34.6	11.6	38.2	15.6
SPD	1,517	35.8	9.6	38.8	16.3
Total	1,161	35.1	10.5	38.5	15.8
Lower Saxony Landtag[a] (1951-1967	385	47.5	8.5	22.5	21.5

[a]As listed in Watson, G. (1969). "Ambition and Opportunity in West German State Politics: The Case of Lower Saxony." Unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Florida, p. 98.

Two relationships which appear in the table need to be mentioned briefly. First of all, it is clear that party officeholding plays a more important role among Bundestag Members than it does in the Landtag; but it is equally apparent that party alone does not give one an effective opportunity to enter Parliament.[2] Only a very small percent-

age of all Deputies (10.5 per cent) come from pure party officeholding backgrounds. Chalmers (1964: 156) in his study of the Social Democratic Party, concluded that "the successful individual campaigner is gaining recognition at the expense of the party functionary." He went on to argue that "in general, at virtually all levels, positions of leadership are widely held to require more and more the ability to deal with persons outside the party" (1964: 160). Our findings tend to confirm this assessment, particularly when we realize that the increase in party officeholding from Landtag to Bundestag is almost totally within that group of persons having both party and public officeholding experience.

Table 20 also provides evidence for one of our major findings. Unlike social variables which often tend to differentiate the parties, the structure of political opportunities transcends these organizations in the sense that both parties require similar experiences on the part of prospective Abgeordnete. In most of the remaining tables of this chapter, information will be broken down by party to further substantiate this point, but we will usually not attempt to examine the inter-party differences in the text.

A somewhat more detailed picture of the opportunity structure can be gained by looking at the most commonly held offices in the Deputies' backgrounds. Before this can be done effectively, however, it is necessary to briefly

explain the office coding scheme used in the collection of data. Since public and party office activities were thought to be relevant to political career advancement, information was gathered on both factors.

Public offices were coded into 43 categories, a number too unwieldy for most purposes, but suitable for maximizing manipulatory possibilities in the later stages of research. Certain marginal activities were excluded although they undoubtedly implied an embryonic interest in politics which would later blossom forth in the drive for office. Thus, on the local level, planning boards, advisory commissions and the like were not counted as public offices. Not all of the public office positions were elective. A variety of postwar zonal bodies, as well as judicial and law enforcement offices and a number of appointive political positions, particularly Land and federal state secretariats, were included in determing the public office backgrounds of Bundestag Deputies. Although the original coding scheme is complex, the major analytical distinction used in this paper is between leadership positions and the more numerous council-legislative offices at each level of government.

Party offices were similarly grouped into 38 categories for data collection purposes. In general, at each level of party organization(see Figure 3, supra) the chairman, vice-chairman, secretary, manager, executive committee members, chairmen of the major functional subcommittees (usually

also executive committee members), and the heads of the women's and youth organization were counted as party office-holders. Membership in functional committees, except for the chairmanship, was not counted in calculating the party backgrounds of Deputies. In the following analysis offices are grouped into eight categories on the basis of a distinction between leadership and executive committee positions at each party organizational level. In this categorization functional committee chairmen and the heads of women's and youth organizations are included in the executive committee designation.

Base Offices

Four public offices were held with great frequency by members of both parties (see Table 21). Inter-party differences are not particularly large, although there is a tendency for SPD members to have local council and Landtag experience, while CDU Deputies are more likely to have served in county councils. The most common public office experience was membership in a local council, such as a Gemeinderat or Stadtverordnetenversammlung. Significantly, the Landtag emerges as another very important base office since over one-fifth of all Deputies had this experience. It is interesting to note that the three local positions were also base offices for the Landtag, which suggests a hierarchy of political opportunity extending from the local level through the Landtag and eventually up to the Bundestag (see Watson, 1969: 95).

TABLE 21

PUBLIC BASE OFFICES[a]

Office	CDU N=644	SPD N=517	Total N=1161
Local council	33.1	38.8	35.6
Mayor	11.6	11.6	11.6
County council	20.3	16.1	18.4
Landtag (backbench only)	20.3	23.6	21.7

[a]Base offices are defined as all positions held by more than 10 per cent of the members of one party. In this case, although there are certain party variations, all four positions qualify as base offices for each party. The columns are nonadditive since persons often held more than one office.

Three of the four base offices are nonleadership positions that share a certain degree of functional similarity with the Bundestag. The fact that these offices, rather than others, are the most common experiences in the background of Deputies supports Schlesinger's (1966: 99-100) argument that ambitions are whetted by manifest conditions that link various office structures together. In this regard the legislative function is an obvious manifest link between local and county councils, the Landtag and the Bundestag.

Party base offices are less uniform, but this is to be expected in light of their differing organizational structures (see Table 22). The definition of a party base

office is somewhat different than that for public positions because the manner in which data was coded did not permit the ready calculation of individual scores. Base party offices are those accounting for at least 10 per cent of all office experiences in the background of Deputies from one party. Local party leadership positions and membership on intermediate level executive committees are the most frequently mentioned background experiences in both parties. In addition, the CDU appears to place some emphasis on local executive committee experience, while Unterbezirk (secondary level) leaders are well represented in the SPD.

TABLE 22

PARTY BASE OFFICES

	CDU N=536[a]	SPD N=422[c]	Total N=958[a]
Local executive committee[b]	16.43	8.29	12.84
Local leaders[c]	24.63	30.81	27.35
Secondary leaders[c]	4.29	11.37	7.41
Primary executive committee[b]	31.72	23.22	27.97

[a]N equals total number of party offices rather than Deputies. Columns do not total to 100.00 per cent because table lists only major categories.

[b]In this and subsequent tables, executive committee designation is broadened to include functional committee chairmen and heads of the women's and youth organizations at each level within the party.

[c]In this and subsequent tables, leaders include the chairman, vice-chairman, secretary, and manager at each level.

Public Office Patterns

The base office approach is helpful in probing some of the common experiences of Bundestag Deputies, but it tells us nothing anout the sequential aspect of the individual's career. Schlesinger (1966: 90) suggests that career patterns be examined in terms of the first and "penultimate," or last offices held by a person before he reaches the position being analyzed. This does not, of course, provide a complete picture of the individual's career, but it has the advantage of being manageable and is intellectually justifiable since it helps to answer two questions: (1) How does one get started in politics and, more importantly, (2) where does the ambitious individual need to be, politically speaking, if he is going to jump to the national stage? In Table 23 public offices are grouped into 10 categories with each cell representing a unique first-and-penultimate-office career path which culminated in election to Parliament.[3]

An examination of the table marginals reveals that 42.7 per cent of Deputies with public or mixed officeholding backgrounds began their public office careers in local councils. This is, of course, not surprising since the local council was by far the most common base office. Almost one-half of these Deputies, however, moved on to higher positions before entering the Bundestag. Local leadership, county council, and Landtag offices were the most common penultimate positions for these individuals.

TABLE 23

THE DISTRIBUTION OF PUBLIC CAREER PATTERNS AMONG BUNDESTAG DEPUTIES WITH A PURE PUBLIC OR MIXED OFFICEHOLDING BACKGROUND

First office	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Total
1. Local council	170	32	44	7	56	8	15	4	10	8	355
2. Local leader	1	16	14	3	5	7	6	4	1	4	61
3. County council	10	3	47	5	15	2	2	-	1	3	88
4. County leader	1	1	1	11	10	3	1	2	-	1	31
5. Landtag (backbench)	7	-	4	-	67	15	23	1	1	2	120
6. Landtag leader or Land Ministry	1	-	-	-	6	19	2	3	1	-	32
7. Parlamentarischerat, Bundestag or Federal Ministry	2	-	1	-	-	2	31	1	-	1	38
8. Appointive political position	1	3	1	-	4	6	9	45	-	-	69
9. Judicial and law enforcement	4	-	1	-	4	2	3	2	16	-	32
10. Other	-	-	--	-	-	2	2	-	-	2	6
Total	197	55	113	26	167	66	94	62	31	21	832[a]

[a]Twenty-three additional Deputies held public offices for which the sequence could not be determined.

The Landtag, also a major base office, is another common starting point in public careers. Most persons (55.8 per cent) who began at the state legislative level remained there until joining the Bundestag. Alternatively, they moved upward to leadership positions within the Landtag and Land government or, particularly in the first session, to the Parliamentarischerat and Federal Ministries.

The three most common paths to national office are: (1) local council, (2) Landtag (backbench), and (3) local council-Landtag (backbench). The clear emergence of these two structures in base and first-penultimate office patterns attests to their central role in the hierarchy of political opportunities. These major pathways are followed by three secondary career sequence patterns: (1) county council, (2) appointive political positions, and (3) local council-county council. The remaining public careers are widely dispersed over a large number of possible patterns.

As we have previously noted, one prerequisite of ambition theory is that opportunities must be structured since an individual must be able to order his expectations. The degree to which public careers are "static" or "flexible" is one measure of the amount of "structure" in the political system. One of the striking features of public careers is the extent to which office experience has been limited to one post. The first and penultimate positions of 50.96 per cent of the Deputies listed in Table 23 are at the same level, as can be seen from an examination of

the main diagonal element.[4] And if we look only at the first seven offices, which are hierarchically arranged, 53.4 per cent of the Members had essentially static public careers prior to their initial entry to the Bundestag. The importance of static career paths is clearly implied by the fact that four of the six most widely used routes to parliamentary office belong in this category. Not all the Deputies, of course, had static careers. Among persons whose careers can be arranged hierarchically an additional 40.7 per cent were upwardly mobile, while just 5.9 per cent had a penultimate office that was "lower" than their original entry point.[5]

Another means of examining the amount of structure in the political opportunity system is to compute the cumulative percentage of all Deputies that followed the most important paths of office. Table 24 lists comparable figures for the Bundestag and the Lower Saxony Landtag. Bundestag opportunities are structured since over one-half of all Deputies (51.6 per cent) followed just four paths to the Bundestag and the top twelve paths encompass the careers of 73.7 per cent of all Members. However, Bundestag careers are not as structured as public office backgrounds in the Landtag since the top twelve paths there encompass 85.2 per cent of the careers. At first glance this is disturbing since one of the fundamental assumptions of ambition theory is that opportunities become increasingly focused as one moves up the hierarchy of public offices and, hence, office careers should be increasingly structured. Schlesinger (1966:

TABLE 24

THE CUMULATIVE PERCENTAGE OF BUNDESTAG AND LANDTAG MEMBERS IN THE MOST IMPORTANT PUBLIC CAREER PATTERNS

	Bundestag paths=(10x10)+1=101[b] N=1161	Lower Saxony Landtag[a] paths=(7x7)+1=50[b] N=227
No prior office	26.4	28.1
2	41.0	42.6
3	46.8	54.4
4	51.6	62.4
8	66.1	77.4
12	73.7	85.2

[a]As listed in Watson, G. (1969). "Ambition and Opportunity in West German State Politics: The Case of Lower Saxony." Unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Florida, p. 107.

[b]The number of possible paths to office is the total number of cells created by cross tabulation first and penultimate offices plus a single category for those who held no prior offices. There are twice as many paths to the Bundestag because of the need to identify additional career experiences not encountered in the Landtag study. There is little reason to believe, however, that increasing the number of coding categories for Landtag members would have significantly altered the distribution of cases and, hence, decreased the amount of structure in public office careers since the same major categories were included in both coding schemes.

199), for example, found that "within the American structure of opportunities, the higher the office the fewer and more sharply defined its career lines." How then can we explain this apparent failure to meet the minimum conditions for ambition to play a recognizable and researchable role in German politics? The answer, it would seem, lies in the differential importance of party ties at the Land and

national level. The parties are, relatively speaking, more important for aspirants for national office than for those individuals primarily interested in state opportunities. Thus, we found earlier in the chapter that the amount of party officeholding was greater in the Bundestag than in the Lower Saxony Landtag. Bundestag public officeholding backgrounds are less structured than at the Land level precisely because the politician who has ambitions for national office can and perhaps must give greater weight to party activities and, consequently, less attention to public activities. When party activity increases in importance, the relative importance of public officeholding and, therefore, the need for structure in that area declines.

The party career patterns of CDU and SPD Deputies are distinctive enough to warrent the conclusion that the parties are oriented in decidedly different directions. Tables 25 and 26 contain the evidence for this statement. Some of the differences are attributable to variations in the organizational structure of the two parties. Thus, the fact that very few CDU Deputies are drawn from secondary-level offices is due to the fact that such positions exist in only four of the Laender (see Figure 3, supra). The most significant difference, however, is the much greater tendency for SPD Deputies to be drawn from leadership positions, which confirms the widely held view that the SPD is the more highly professionalized party. Almost three-

TABLE 25

THE DISTRIBUTION OF PARTY CAREER PATTERNS AMONG CDU DEPUTIES WITH A PURE PARTY OR MIXED OFFICEHOLDING BACKGROUND

First Office	Penultimate office: Local executive committee	Local leader	Secondary executive committee	Secondary leader
Local executive committee	31	8	5	-
Local leader	1	68	1	7
Secondary executive committee	-	-	5	-
Secondary leader	--	-	-	7
Primary executive committee	-	4	-	1
Primary leader	-	-	-	-
National executive committee	-	-	-	-
National leader	-	-	-	-
Total	32	80	11	15

[a]Career sequence indeterminate for 27 CDU Deputies. They are excluded from the table above.

Table 25 (continued)

Primary executive committee	Primary leader	National executive committee	National leader	Total
17	2	3	-	66
13	3	3	-	96
2	-	1	-	8
2	-	-	-	9
58	6	14	1	84
1	15	2	3	21
2	-	6	-	8
-	-	-	-	2
95	26	29	6	294[a]

TABLE 26

THE DISTRIBUTION OF PARTY CAREER PATTERNS AMONG SPD DEPUTIES WITH A PURE PARTY OR MIXED OFFICEHOLDING BACKGROUNDS

First office	Penultimate office: Local executive committee	Local leader	Secondary executive committee	Secondary leader
Local executive committee	11	5	-	2
Local leader	-	59	2	12
Secondary executive committee	1	-	7	-
Secondary leader	-	2	-	18
Primary executive committee	-	2	-	2
Primary leader	-	-	-	-
National executive committee	-	1	-	-
National leader	-	-	-	-
Total	12	69	9	34

[a]Career sequence indeterminate for 28 SPD Deputies. They are excluded from the table above.

Table 26 (continued)

Primary executive committee	Primary leader	National executive committee	National leader	Total
1	-	2	-	21
11	4	1	-	89
3	-	1	-	12
3	-	1	-	24
25	2	2	-	33
-	18	8	1	27
-	-	10	1	12
-	-	-	2	2
43	24	25	6	220[a]

fourths (70.5 per cent) of SPD Members with a pure party or mixed officeholding background began or culminated their pre-Bundestag careers with a leadership position, while only one-half (50.9 per cent) of CDU Deputies did so. These same differences are reflected in the most common office patterns in each party. Although party office careers in both parties are about equally structured (the top four categories account for 59.1 per cent and 54.6 per cent of all career patterns in the CDU and SPD, respectively), only one of the top four patterns in the CDU involves a leadership office (local leader), while three of the four most important patterns in the SPD (local leader, secondary leader, primary leader) do so.

Party career patterns are generally consistent with what one would expect given some knowledge of their organizational structures and the role of professional politicians in each. One unexpected finding, however, is the highly static nature of party careers. Apparently the public office structure is more open to upward movement than the party structure since 68.2 per cent of SPD party careers and 65.2 per cent of CDU party office patterns are static. Only one of the major career patterns in either party (local executive committee-primary executive committee in the CDU) involves a movement between organizational levels and none involves a movement from executive committee to leadership position at any level. There are two possible partial

explanations for this phenomenon. First of all, there may be a tendency for Deputies to give a more complete description of their public office background in their official Handbuch biographies and to mention only their leading party positions. It seems unreasonable, for example, that one-third (33.7 per cent) of SPD Deputies and two-fifths (39.1 per cent) of CDU Members would begin their party careers at the primary level or higher positions which should require years of loyal party service. This did, however, happen at times and leads directly to the second explanation. In the immediate postwar period there was a political vacuum and the parties recruited heavily from elements previously uninvolved in political affairs. Carlo Schmid (SPD) is an excellent example of a major leader who had not been politically active until after the collapse of the Third Reich. Because the number of opportunities was large, relative to the people available to fill these positions, inexperienced politicians were able to advance rapidly. In addition, our coding scheme does not include pre-1945 party activities in the construction of career patterns although many Deputies in the early sessions had such experiences. At least as far as our model is concerned the political slate was essentially blank in 1945. The rapid rise of new elements after 1945 and the failure to consider pre-1945 experiences, coupled with the tenacity with which party elites retain their offices, go a long way toward explaining the static nature of party

career patterns: Those persons who entered the Bundestag in the early sessions and, hence, were likely to have relatively short, simple career lines, are over represented in this category and obscure the more complex relationship that has emerged over time. As Edinger (1968: 187) has noted "upward mobility through the parties is no longer as easy and rapid as in the early years of political reconstruction, but this pattern of recruiting the political elite has become quite firmly institutionalized." This interpretation is further substantiated by the findings that the mean number of party offices in the backgrounds of newly elected Deputies has risen steadily from a low of 0.609 in 1949 to a high of 1.206 in 1969.

Career Indices

After gaining an initial impression of the interrelationship of public and party officeholding by grouping Deputies in four categories, we moved on to examine the structure of public and party officeholding separately. In an attempt to present career material in a more parsimonious and potentially useful manner, six political background indices have been constructed and scores calculated for each Deputy. Table 27 summarizes these indicators, showing the distribution of values

TABLE 27

POLITICAL BACKGROUND INDICES

Index	N	Index Value 0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	Mean
1. Total number of public offices											
CDU	644	27.2	31.1	22.2	12.1	6.8	0.6				1,422
SPD	517	25.3	29.8	25.0	12.0	7.0	1.0				1,483
Total	1,161	26.4	30.5	23.4	12.1	6.9	0.8				1,450
2. Number of concurrent public offices											
CDU	644	31.7	49.8	15.7	2.8						0.899
SPD	517	26.1	54.0	16.4	3.5						0.973
Total	1,161	29.2	51.7	16.0	3.1						0.930
3. Highest level of public office-holding											
CDU	644	27.5[a]	27.3	7.6	20.5	5.9	11.2				2.531[b]
SPD	517	25.5[a]	30.2	9.9	20.3	6.0	8.1				2.356[b]
Total	1,161	26.6[a]	28.6	8.6	20.4	5.9	9.8				2.451[b]
4. Total number of party offices[c]											
CDU	644	50.2	26.9	15.2	5.4	1.9	0.5				0.833
SPD	517	52.0	24.8	15.3	6.2	1.0	0.8				0.816
Total	1,161	51.0	25.9	15.2	5.8	1.5	0.6				0.826

Table 27 (continued)

Index	N	Index Values 0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	Mean
5. Number of concurrent party offices											
CDU	644	50.2	35.1	9.6	4.7	0.5					0.701
SPD	517	52.0	31.2	11.8	3.9	1.2					0.710
Total	1,161	51.0	33.3	10.6	4.3	0.8					0.705
6. Highest level of party officeholding											
CDU	644	50.2	5.0	12.4	2.2	2.2	16.8	3.9	6.4	1.1	4.121[b]
SPD	517	52.0	2.1	13.2	2.9	6.0	11.8	4.1	7.2	0.8	4.185[b]
Total	1,161	51.0	3.7	12.7	2.5	3.9	14.6	4.0	6.7	0.9	4.149[b]

[a]Includes 2 CDU Deputies and 1 SPD Deputy who held public offices that could not be rank-ordered.

[b]Variable mean based on relevant officeholders only (variable value "0" excluded from calculations).

[c]Measure of total number of party offices differs from comparable public office variable because intermediate offices (those acquired after the first office, but no longer held at time of election) are excluded.

The first index is a summary measure of the total number of public offices in an individual's background prior to his initial election to the House. Our original coding scheme provided space for six possible offices, but no more than five were held by any one individual. The values of this variable therefore range from 0 to 5.

The second index measures the number of public offices actually held at the time of initial election to the Bundestag. Included in the index are the penultimate office and up to two additional positions. The values range form 0 to 3. This index is somewhat less reliable than the first because of one weakness in the original data coding scheme: it is assumed, but not proven, that the penultimate office is actually held at the time of election. If the individual has other current public offices, of course, by definition the penultimate office is held at the time of election. The problem exists among those Deputies whose coding sheet did not indicate any other concurrent offices. A few of these persons no longer held the office in question at the time of initial election and are incorrectly counted as having one concurrent public office rather than none. The magnitude of this error, which probably occurred less than a dozen times, is quite small. If 25 cases were misplaced, the mean value of Index 2 would decline from 0.930 to 0.910.

The third index is a measure of the highest level of public officeholding where public offices are categorized

on a five-point scale from 1 to 5 in ascending order. Local and county council positions and other nonleadership posts at these levels are grouped into the first stratum. Local and county leaders, basically mayors and county managers, comprise the second level. Membership in the Landtag (backbench), lower state courts, and other nonleadership positions at the Land level are included in the third category, while Land leadership positions, both in the Landtag and in the Land government, are at the fourth level. All national positions are considered to be at the highest level. Included here are Members of the Parlamentaischerat, Federal Ministers who later joined the Bundestag, federal state secretaries, and a few persons who had served in the Bundestag under other party labels, or who re-entered the House after failing to seek or win election at some time. Variable values range from 0 (no office background) to 5. This is strictly an ordinal scale and the calculation of means from such data is potentially misleading. Used with care, however, and keeping in mind the distribution across categories, it has proven to be a helpful measure of career experiences.

The last three indices are essentially the same as the first three except that they apply to party office experience. The values for the total number of party offices range from 0 to 5, while the number of concurrent offices ranges from 0 to 4. In determining the highest level of party office-

holding in the Deputies' backgrounds, positions were coded into the same eight categories used throughout this chapter, with a value of 1 corresponding to local executive committee membership and a value of 8 indicating the highest level of national party leadership. The values range from 0 (no office background) to 8.

Table 27 confirms the impression gained from previous material that the parties are strikingly similar in the amount and kind of public office experiences that they require of successful candidates. The slight party differences in the mean values of Index 1 and Index 2 are consistent with the view that the SPD is the more highly professionalized party. In seeming contradiction to this view is the fact that the mean of Index 3, the highest level of public officeholding, is lower in the SPD. This can probably be attributed to the advantage enjoyed by the CDU at the national level since the SPD was denied access to ministerial posts and related offices until 1966.

In spite of the fact that the parties tend to draw Deputies from different points within their respective office structures, they exhibit almost identical distributions of the total number of party offices and the number of concurrent party offices. This finding strongly reinforces the thesis that the structure of poltical opportunities transcends the parties in a variety of ways.

Opportunities, however, have not remained stable over the 20-year period since the foundation of the Federal

Republic. Table 28 lists the sessional means for each of the six indices, making possible a brief examination of time trends in political background experiences. These patterns are particularly interesting because they clearly show the increasing importance of party experience in gaining entry to the Bundestag.

In general, the amount and level of public activity have been stable within relatively narrow ranges of fluctuation. The only major exception to this pattern is the much higher level of public officeholding exhibited by Members of the First Bundestag. The other public indices for the first session are also fairly high, but no consistent trend emerges from them. The higher average level of public office experience among first session Deputies is at least partially attributable to their early monopoly of leading positions in the immediate postwar period, a factor which we have previously discussed with regard to party offices. Specifically, the higher showing is due to the prior membership of many first-session Deputies in the Parlamentarischerat, the national constituent assembly that drew up the Basic Law and electoral statute in 1948-1949. The Parlamentarischerat is included in the highest level of the public office hierarchy. Very few individuals after the first session held national office prior to their entry into the Bundestag.

At every election since 1949 the three party office indices have shown consistent trends. The total number of

TABLE 28

TIME TRENDS IN POLITICAL BACKGROUND INDICES
(mean values)

	1 Total public offices N=1161	2 Concurrent public offices N=1161	3 Highest public office N=852	4 Total party offices N=1161	5 Concurrent party offices N=1161	6 Highest party offices N=569
First (1949-1953)	1.536	0.920	3.121	0.609	0.536	4.983
Second (1953-1957)	1.298	0.886	2.105	0.675	0.548	4.098
Third (1957-1961)	1.410	0.884	2.301	0.815	0.659	4.207
Fourth (1961-1965)	1.652	0.994	2.331	0.877	0.735	3.840
Fifth (1965-1969)	1.534	1.035	2.204	1.007	0.911	3.811
Sixth (1969-)	1.288	0.906	2.220	1.206	1.047	3.727
All (1949-1969)	1.450	0.930	2.451	0.826	0.705	4.149

party offices and the number of concurrent party offices in the background of the average newly elected Deputy have approximately doubled in the 20-year period. At the same time, the average level of the highest party office has declined steadily, again probably due to the entrenchment of existing elites.

Time trends not only show a steady increase in the absolute number of party offices in the backgrounds of newly elected Deputies, they also expose the altered relationship between the number of public and party offices that is concealed by the means for the twenty-year period. In the 1969 election the total number of party offices in the Deputies' backgrounds very nearly equalled the total number of public positions. And the average number of concurrent party offices exceeded the average number of concurrent public offices for the first time, although there continued to be slightly more Members with public office experience (69.5 per cent) than with party office backgrounds (64.7 per cent). The structure of political opportunity is obviously undergoing incremental change as a new generation of "political technicians," increasingly brought up through the parties, replaces the older "transitional" generation that emerged in the 1950's (see Kaack, 1969: 57-59; Edinger, 1968: 189).

The Impact on Candidacy

Having described in some detail the general outlines of the political opportunity structure as it is revealed in the background experiences of newly elected Deputies, the final portion of this chapter is devoted to an examination of the more specific impact of these background experiences on the selection of Deputies in terms of the type and security of initial candidacy.

District versus List Candidacy

The impact of political factors on a Deputy's career begins at the level of his initial candidacy. Table 29 lists the mean values of the six political background indices for all district and list candidates. Although the differences between the two types of candidates are not particularly large, they are consistent with what one would expect to find. Thus, district candidates have more and higher public offices in their backgrounds and fewer and lower party offices, suggesting that they are tied to the public office structure and the local party organization, while list candidates have stronger ties to upper levels of the party.

Safe versus Unsafe List Seats

In Chapter Three we saw how certain social factors were clearly related to the propensity to be elected from safe list seats. In general, these positions went

TABLE 29

POLITICAL FACTORS AND CANDIDACY

Index	Candidacy	
	District	List
Total public offices	1.541	1.356
Concurrent public offices	0.997	0.871
Highest public office[a]	2.538	2.303
Total party offices	0.706	0.896
Concurrent party offices	0.610	0.767
Highest party office[a]	3.984	4.143

[a]Mean computed only on the basis of actual officeholders.

to groups that were under represented in district nominations, but important enough to demand consideration at the Land level. In an attempt to see if political backgrounds were equally relevant to seat security, the means of the six political indices were computed for Deputies elected from safe and unsafe list seats. The results are presented in Table 30. As can easily be seen there is no consistent relationship between the indices and the propensity to be elected from a secure list position, although Deputies from safe seats have fewer public and party offices. The most reasonable interpretation of the table is simply that political experience per se is unrelated to seat safeness. We can perhaps explain the failure to find a significant relationship in terms of the fact

TABLE 30

POLITICAL INDICES AND LIST SEAT SECURITY

Index	Safe N=188	Unsafe N=348
1. Total public offices	1.314	1.388
2. Concurrent public offices	0.782	0.917
3. Highest public office[a]	1.627	1.626
4. Total party offices	0.826	0.943
5. Concurrent party offices	0.734	0.807
6. Highest party office[a]	2.261	2.112

[a]Index mean was calculated on the basis of total N rather than just officeholders. This mean is not comparable to figures in previous tables.

that lists are used to balance the total party ticket socially, as well as to ensure the election of leading party figures, and are therefore likely to be quite heterogeneous. Results such as these could occur, for example, if safe list seats were assigned to party elites, experts, and representative of major interest groups, while unsafe positions were given to less influential, but highly active party members, with modest public office experience.

District Competitiveness

Unlike party lists, experience and security, defined as an absence of inter-party competition are closely

related in the districts. The absolute differences in the two-party percentage of the total vote at the last election were used as a measure of political competitiveness and related to the political background characteristics of the 193 Deputies elected in districts since 1961. The results are presented in Table 31. Candidates elected in competitive districts are younger, have fewer public offices and more party offices than any other group. At the same time, they have lower public and party offices. All of these factors suggest that persons elected in competitive districts are primarily young, ambitious party activists. On the other hand, those elected in noncompetitive districts are older, have more public office experience and, significantly, higher public offices in their background. At the same time they have fewer and lower party offices than any other group, a further indication of their strong ties to the public electoral constituency.

In general, background factors are related to district competitiveness in the following manner: as the security of the nomination increases, the breadth of public office experience also increases. The theory most consistent with this pattern is one that emphasizes that candidates in noncompetitive areas have to serve a longer and probably more complex political apprenticeship in the public arena because of a low turnover rate in the Bundestag. In competitive districts turnover is likely to be greater.

TABLE 31

POLITICAL FACTORS AND CONSTITUENCY COMPETITIVENESS[a]

Index	District		
	Competitive N=55	Semicompetitive N=66	Noncompetitive N=72
Total public offices	1.291	1.576	1.597
Concurrent public offices	0.836	1.182	1.083
Highest public office[b]	1.309	1.606	1.806
Total party offices	0.982	0.909	0.819
Concurrent party offices	0.855	0.864	0.681
Highest party office[b]	1.909	2.242	1.569
Age at initial entry	43.709	45.076	45.458

[a]Competitiveness is measured by difference between the percentages of total vote going to the major parties in the second ballot (Zweitestimme) at the last election. Competitive, semicompetitive and noncompetitive categories are based on criteria proposed by Heino Kaack (1969: 13). In competitive districts the difference between percentages of vote going to the parties is 5.0 per cent or less of the total vote. Semicompetitive districts range from a vote difference of 5.1 per cent to a maximum difference of 16.0 per cent. Noncompetitive districts are those in which the difference between the two parties' vote is greater than 16.0 per cent. Interestingly enough, it is competitiveness at the last election that distinguishes between officeholders. The same calculations were performed on vote totals for the election at which the Deputy was selected, but failed to reveal meaningful relationships. Thus, in a very direct sense, past realities seem to have altered the present perceptions of candidates and parties in a manner entirely consistent with our interpretation of political opportunity.

TABLE 31 (continued)

[b]Index mean was calculated on the basis of total N rather than just officeholders. It is not comparable to figures in previous tables, with the exception of Table 30.

The nomination there is apparently more open to younger, less experienced politicians precisely because it is less secure and, hence, less desirable. It may be that the only persons willing to exert the effort necessary to win a close election are strong party activists.

Having shown that political backgrounds are directly related to the type and security of a Deputy's candidacy, our analysis of the structure of political opportunities is complete. We have seen that advancement opportunities are highly ordered in the political parties and the public office hierarchy. In the public arena opportunities for advancement are best for those persons presently serving in a local council, county council, or Landtag since those positions share a common legislative function with the Bundestag. In the parties, local leaders and primary-level executive committee members are most likely to be advanced to the House. We have also found that the opportunity structure is national in scope and, somewhat paradoxically, transcends the parties at the same time that it is channelled through them. Finally, while the shape of the opportunity structure is undergoing constant incremental change, developments are clearly in the direction of more structure not less. All of these facts point to the possible utility of the concept of political ambition in the German context.

NOTES

1. The terms "size" and "shape" are borrowed from Schlesinger (1966: 20). He defines the size of the opportunity structure as "the number of offices available and the frequency with which new men attain them." The shape of the opportunity structure "derives from the ways in which men typically advance in politics." Key variables in determining the shape of the structure are: base offices, manifest offices, and first-penultimate office patterns (70-118).

2. This conclusion is based on a comparison of the percentage of all Deputies and Landtag Members who had party office experience. These figures are obtained by adding the percentage of Deputies with pure party and mixed officeholding backgrounds. Thirty-one per cent of Landtag members held party offices while 49% of Bundestag Deputies had this background.

3. Our definition of penultimate office differs from Schlesinger's (1966: 90) because of the multiple office-holding factor in German politics. Rather than being the last office acquired by an individual, the penultimate office is defined as the last office acquired which is still held at initial election or, if no offices are held at the time of election, the office that was retained until most recently.

4. The office categories often include several discrete positions so one cannot conclude that these individuals held only one office, just that any movement would have been quite limited.

5. All cells in the first seven columns of the table that are above and to the right of the diagonal element are classified as upwardly mobile. All cells in the first seven columns and first seven rows that are below and to the left of the diagonal element are classified as downwardly mobile. It should be kept in mind, however, that since we are only dealing with the first and last positions acquired by the individual, an intermediate position might have altered his classification, particularly if it were higher than the penultimate office.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

In this final chapter our goal is to move beyond simple description of the opportunity structure to more speculative fields. It is our intention to make use of a limited amount of data, admittedly imperfect, to suggest several directions in which future research employing the kind of data studied here might prove to be fruitful.

One question of intrinsic interest is the degree to which political ambitions can be identified from background characteristics. A most worthwhile undertaking supplementing the research here would be an interview-based study of Deputies with the purpose of assessing their ambitions as being discrete, static, or progressive (see Schlesinger, 1966: 10). A comparison could then be made with their career backgrounds to determine the actual correlation between political experiences and ambition. Without interview data, of course, it is impossible to arrive at a definitive answer, but perhaps a tentative assessment can be made by extrapolating from the internal structure of opportunity in the Bundestag. While we can say little about discrete ambitions, it may be possible

to identify static and progressive dimensions in the behavior of Deputies.

Static ambition is the desire to hold a particular office for a prolonged period. Barber (1965: 19) defines "high willingness to return" to the Connecticut legislature as a positive answer to the question "How likely is it that you would be willing to serve three or more terms in the Assembly in the future?" Although he chooses to use this primarily as a measure of group satisfaction, it would appear to be roughly synonymous with static career ambition. Similarly, Schlesinger (1966: 43) defines a "career office" as one typically held for at least 12 years. One possible indicator of this dimension of ambition, then, is the number of times a Deputy has been elected to the House. At any given session about two-thirds of the Deputies are incumbents who have served at least one additional term. Of the 1,161 Deputies in this study, 688 have served two or more terms and 426 have served in at least three sessions. For purposes of this discussion, we will equate static ambition with serving three or more terms in the Bundestag.

Within the House, progressive ambition may be defined in terms of holding a high or low position of leadership. The classification of leaders into high and low categories follows the criteria established by Kaack (1969: 41). High leadership posts include the Federal Ministries, major Fraktion offices, and the Presidency

and Vice-Presidencies of the Bundestag. Low leadership posts include the Bundestag Vorstand, Fraktion Vorstand, Altestenrat, and committee and work group chairmanships. Two hundred fifty persons have held low leadership posts while 104 individuals have held high positions.[1]

If political variables are going to be useful in classifying people in terms of their ambition, it is necessary that the hypothesized groups exhibit model characteristics that distinguish them from the general body of Deputies. Table 32 lists the distribution of values and means for two political indices developed in the last chapter which do discriminate between the third-term incumbents, low leaders, and high leaders at an aggregate level (see the means).

Unfortunately, however, it is apparent upon examining the categorical distributions that we cannot say very much about incumbents, since they hardly differ from the population of all Members. There are several possible explanations for this failure to find some pattern which would distinguish incumbents from other Deputies. First of all, incumbents, like leaders, are also included in the group of 1161 Deputies and, hence, the net result is to obscure any inter-group differences. Secondly, our measure of static ambitions may be unreliable since some leaders are also third-term incumbents. Finally, it is always possible that political background factors at initial recruitment are simply unrelated to static ambitions.

TABLE 32

COMPARATIVE POLITICAL INDICATORS FOR INCUMBENTS, LOW LEADERS AND HIGH LEADERS

Index	Index 0	1	2	3	4
Highest public office at initial election					
New members	26.6	28.6	8.6	20.4	5.9
Incumbents	28.2	26.3	7.5	21.4	5.6
Low leaders	27.2	25.6	6.0	20.4	8.0
High leaders	25.0	17.3	3.8	18.3	9.6
Highest party office at initial election					
New members	51.0	3.7	12.7	2.5	3.9
Incumbents	52.1	2.6	11.7	1.1	4.5
Low leaders	46.8	2.0	8.4	2.0	4.0
High leaders	45.2	1.9	7.7	1.0	3.8

[a]The mean values are calculated on basis of office-holders only (index value "0" excluded).

TABLE 32 (continued)

Value				
5	6	7	8	Mean[a]
9.8				2.451
11.0				2.549
12.8				2.676
26.0				3.308
14.6	4.0	6.7	0.9	4.149
15.0	4.7	7.5	0.7	4.363
17.2	6.4	12.4	0.8	4.857
12.5	4.8	16.3	6.7	5.386

Third-term incumbents do exhibit recognizable traits, but these refer to their present situation, not past experiences.[2] Thus, although they did not enter the Bundestag at a notably younger or older age than other persons, they are considerably older than the average new Member while serving their third term. Perhaps all Deputies come to the House with some sense of progressive ambition, only to have it thwarted by the passage of time. Certainly Deputies who are in their third or fourth term without having acquired a leading position are aware that only a handful (22 of 250 low leaders, 17 of 104 high leaders) of Members have advanced after 8 years in the House. This political fact may be much more relevant to fostering static ambitions than the Deputy's pre-Bundestag career pattern. In any case, lacking interview data, we cannot confirm any positive relationship between political career experiences prior to entering the Bundestag and a Deputy's tendency to have static ambitions.

For the two leadership categories, however, the picture is considerably different. As might be expected, the most distinctive group is the high leadership echelon in the Bundestag and federal government. In addition to the tendency to have higher public and party offices, high leaders entered the Bundestag at an earlier than average age (44.5 years) compared both to low leaders (45.6 years) and the entire population of new Members

(47.9 years). This is quite remarkable really, when we consider that the total number of high leaders is rather small and the sample includes a number of men like Adenauer, Erhard, and Erwin Schoettle, who entered the Bundestag in their fifties, or in the case of Adenauer, in their seventies. Over one-fourth (26.0 per cent) of all high leaders held a national public office prior to entering the Bundestag in comparison to only 9.8 per cent for all new Members. Similarly, 23.0 per cent of the high leaders held a national party position prior to their entry compared to just 7.6 per cent for all new Members. Low leaders are also fairly distinctive, particularly in terms of the percentage who have had national party experience before joining the Bundestag.

Another way to look at the same material is to examine the percentage of Deputies with particular background experiences who reach a position of leadership. Table 33 summarizes this material for low and high leaders. It is apparent that there is a sharp increase in the probability of getting at least a low leadership position when one holds either a Land-level public leadership post, or a primary-level party leadership office. Thus, 70 per cent of persons who entered the legislature with national party leadership backgrounds became high leaders in the House or federal government. Below this level, however, opportunities decline rapidly and it is not really possible to assign ambitions on the basis of our limited information.

TABLE 33

OPPORTUNITY FOR RE-ELECTION, AND LEADERSHIP FOR DEPUTIES BY THE LEVEL OF PUBLIC AND PARTY BACKGROUND EXPERIENCE

		Level of Office Experience								
		0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Public office background	N=	309	332	200	237	69	224			
low leaders		22.0	19.3	15.0	21.5	29.0	28.1			
high leaders		8.4	5.4	4.0	8.0	14.5	23.7			
Party office background	N=	592	43	147	29	45	170	47	78	10
low leaders		28.2	11.6	24.3	17.2	22.2	25.3	34.0	39.7	20.0
high leaders		7.9	4.7	5.4	3.4	8.9	7.6	11.7	21.8	70.0

Within the Bundestag, the opportunity structure is clearly oriented toward younger men with high levels of party and public office experience. It is this group that should exhibit the greatest tendency to have progressive ambitions. A definitive answer, however, will have to wait on survey research.

Not only can the study of political backgrounds help us understand the ambitions of politicians, but it may possibly be related to other behavioral dimensions as well. Three areas worth exploring are: role orientations, levels of activity in the House, and vote deviancy. Gunlicks (1969) has examined the role perceptions of local councilors in Lower Saxony with special regard to the "representative" or "delegate" function of an elected official. He found that role orientations varied by party, with the SPD most likely to accept the delegate model. It may be, however, that career experiences and the general inter-party differences in recruitment also condition role orientation. Thus, the tendency for the CDU to explicitly acknowledge the legitimacy of subgroup interests may operate to reinforce this representational role in the Bundestag. An intensive examination of the relationship between Deputy role perceptions and political backgrounds would be of some interest, particularly if it revealed that it was not backgrounds per se, but rather ambitions which were relevant to political behavior.

Still another way in which political backgrounds may be related to behavior is in terms of the amount and kind of activity within the Bundestag. Loewenberg (1966: 107-128) briefly probed this dimension when he examined participation in debate, but most of his criteria, the reader will recall, were social variables. Nevertheless, he did find that a group of professional parliamentarians dominated debate and leadership in the house, while other participants tended to confine their participation to one or a limited number of topics. If the concept of "manifest" functional relationships between the Bundestag and lower-level legislative chambers has any meaning beyond a simple recruitment function, it should show up in the participation of these Deputies in the life of the House.

Finally, backgrounds may be related to the dimension of party loyalty as it is expressed in roll-call voting. This dimension has been explored by Rueckert and Crane (1962) and Dishaw (forthcoming),[3] but again the major emphasis has been on social variables. It is not unreasonable to imagine, however, that Deputies tied to the local public office arena rather than the party might exhibit different patterns of vote deviancy.

These suggestions certainly do not exhaust the research possibilities which can be based upon a knowledge of the social and political opportunity structures and the backgrounds of individual Deputies. They do, however, provide some guidelines for further research on a subject with considerable potential.

Our conclusions have been drawn throughout the paper and there is little reason to summarize them in detail here. Starting with a general interest in the bases of recruitment and the possible role played by individual ambition, we went on to develop a model of the recruitment process based on the selective perception of opportunities. Our research on the structure of political opportunity in Germany provides some support for this model since Deputies are differentially recruited on the basis of social and political criteria. It is our belief that opportunities for relevant political advancement in the Federal Republic are structured to a degree that strongly suggests that ambitious politicians are capable of understanding their relative position in that structure and can, therefore, act to maximize goal attainment. Under these circumstances ambition can be a meaningful, researchable political variable. The author hopes to make continuing use of the data in the future as he attempts to directly examine that phenomenon which Schlesinger says "lies at the heart of politics" (1966: 1).

NOTES

1. Membership in the two leadership groups is partially overlapping since some persons held both low and high positions during their career. Persons are assigned only once to a category (when they first reach that level) and if they hold both high and low positions at the same time they are only included in the higher group.

2. One of the most interesting findings is that 67.2 per cent of third-term incumbents held no public offices at the time of re-election. Only 29.2 per cent of newly elected Deputies did not have public positions. Similarly, the mean number of public offices dropped from 0.930 per newly elected Member to 0.429 among third-term incumbents. At the same time, incumbent Deputies were likely to retain or increase the number of party offices which they held. The mean number of party offices rose from 0.705 for new Members to 0.762 for incumbents. Although the rise is not sharp, in contrast to the decline in public office-holding it is certainly significant. It is likely that Deputies regard party activity as more relevant to their future career advancement than continued public officeholding at lower levels.

3. The study by F. H. Dishaw is described in a personal letter to the author dated October 9, 1970.

APPENDIX

OCCUPATIONAL BACKGROUNDS

Occupation	Listed	Assessed
Professional politicians		
Party employees	37	64
Land or lower elective office	53	97
Federal minister	12	12
Politically appointed civil servants	24	36
Politically appointed civil servants (retired)	26	15
No other occupation besides Bundestag mandate	10	63
Bundestag President or Vice President	-	1
Public Employees		
Career Civil servants (Beamte)	73	60
Career Civil servants (retired)	29	21
Other public employees	31	25
Other public employees (retired)	2	-
Career Ministers	-	-
Career Ministers (retired)	5	1
Career Military	7	6
Judiciary, public prosecutors, law enforcement	16	12
Judiciary, public prosecutors, law enforcement (retired)	5	5
Free Professions		
Journalists	18	10
Primary and secondary school teachers, principals	60	53
University professors, lecturers, etc.	38	29
Physicians	16	16
Lawyers and notaries in private practice	78	63
Editors and publishers	36	21
Engineers	16	10
Scientists	3	2
Clergy	9	9
Other	47	23

APPENDIX A (continued)

Occupation	Listed	Assessed
Business-Commerce and Industry		
Management and owners of large enterprizes	16	17
Mangers and owners of medium-sized businesses	34	35
Mittelstand (small business, artisans. handworker)	53	50
Other, unspecified	30	37
Labor		
White-collar employees	45	29
Skilled labor	40	24
other, unspecified	5	5
unskilled labor	3	-
Agriculture		
Independent farmers	79	73
Renters, leasees, managers, advisors	2	1
Agronomist	-	-
Agricultural processors	4	6
Interest Group Employees		
Business and industry	19	23
Mittelstand	4	4
Farm	9	11
Labor (including Catholic and white-collar unions)	97	120
Catholic Church (including its youth groups)	3	5
Protestant Church	9	9
Veterans, disabled veterans, and war victims	5	5
Refugees and expellees	5	7
Non-party youth organizations, such as YMCA	2	2
Public interest groups	5	8
Other		
Housewives	33	18
Retiree	-	1
Other	4	4
Indeterminate	4	13
Total	1161	1161

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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Gerald Glenn Watson was born August 17, 1945, at Salem, Oregon. In June, 1963, he graduated from North Salem High School. In May, 1967, he received the degree of Bachelor of Arts, magna cum laude, with majors in political science and history from Willamette University.

During his final year at Willamette University, he was Senior Scholar of the political science department under Dr. Theodore L. Shay. After graduation he worked briefly as a group life supervisor for MacLaren School for Boys at Woodburn, Oregon.

In September, 1967, he enrolled in the graduate school of the University of Florida under an NDEA IV fellowship. By March 1969 he received his Master of Arts. His thesis was a study of "Ambition and Opportunity in West German State Politics: The Case of Lower Saxony." Since that time he has pursued his work toward the Doctorate of Philosophy.

Gerald Glenn Watson is married to the former Diane Lynn Peterson. He is a member of the Political Science Association, Pi Sigma Alpha, Phi Eta Sigma. and Pi Gamma Mu.

I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

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Professor of Political Science

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Keith R. Legg
Associate Professor of
Political Science

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W. A. Rosenbaum
Associate Professor of
Political Science

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David P. Conradt
Assistant Professor of
Political Science

I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

Harry W. Paul
Associate Professor of History

This dissertation was submitted to the Department of Political Science in the College of Arts and Sciences and to the Graduate Council, and was accepted as partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

December, 1971

Dean, Graduate School

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